"Military experts conclude from the way Damascus described the episode Wednesday, Sept. 6, that the Pantsyr-S1E missiles, purchased from Russia to repel air assailants, failed to down the Israeli jets accused of penetrating northern Syrian airspace from the Mediterranean the night before. The new Pantsyr missiles therefore leave Syrian and Iranian airspace vulnerable to hostile intrusion."

The whole of the Arab Middle East air-defence complex is in turmoil. The Israeli planes on the recent raid into Syria got through to the targets almost if anti-aircraft missile defences did not exist. Since the Iranians use roughly the same technology, they too are in a panic. This means that their expensively purchased Russian systems have laid them open to uninterrupted air assault at a time when such a thing might well be on the cards.
The Russians are ripping the Arabs off good and proper. They are selling them AA systems which are of no use to their own armed forces because they are either reject or underdeveloped prototypal systems which have not come up to standards of the Russian armed forces.
The evidence for this is the disclosure is that the Russians are keeping state of the art kit for themselves ad giving the Arabs half-eaten trifles. Here's the modern gear the Russians are developing:
"Following the initial deployment of the S-400 strategic anti-missile air defense system, the Russian Army plans to embark on a modernization of its tactical air defense assets, with the fielding of a modernized version of the Tor-M2 and BUK M3 missiles.
Tor M2 features significantly enhanced target acquisition capabilities and shorter close-in (minimum range) capability of 1,000 meters, improving its effectiveness protecting against precision guided weapons. Another improvement will be fielded with the Buk M1 system (SA-11 Gadfly) which will be upgraded to M3 capability. This version is expected to become operational by 2009 featuring modernized electronics. Some 400 SA-8 (Gecko) mobile air defense units currently in service will also be modernized. By that time, mobile short range Tunguska missile-gun system, and Strela 10 (SA-13 Gopher) will also be modernized with improved all-weather and night capability."
http://www.defense-update.com/newscast/0907/news/230907_russian_sam.htm

The AA units the Russians are selling are not well developed electronically, and this is because of a far too hurried development phase in order to secure orders and sales for a cash-starved Russia. In addition, the training of Arab personnel on extremely complex equipment is a problem all by itself. Operational training is poor with almost no live-round firing at decoys. Simulators are rare beasts with inadequate software. Command and communication links throughout combined missile batteries is not up to Western standards and is most vulnerable even to low-tech jamming.
In other words, bringing these Iraq and Iranian missile units up to full operational standards against high-flying supersonic aircraft is a big problem.

Physically the Russian ground AA units look most impressive. The well-designed aerial and multiple missile configurations on wheeled chassis show typically fine Russian physical engineering. However, the human/electronic operational interface is not good, and modern military ergonomics is a not a strong point with Russian designers.

These things are most important because everything depends of course on the efficiency of the team inside the control shack. Russia for many reasons lost the lead in armoured vehicle design after WW2. Their fighting compartments in tanks in particular are far too small, particularly the driving compartments (see after the battle ex) The same could be said of important operator seating before complex equipment control panels. The layout ergonomics are not good, just look at the lash-up in the picture above. The roof of the vehicle is so low, no operator could see the screen directly, and if he or she tried, they would certainly have neck and back problems by the end of the military day! Also, as can be seen from this picture  Russians still tend to use far too many plug and socket arrangements, cable connectors and unnecessary numbers of junction boxes. Frankly that picture shows equipment which would be a servicing nightmare.

The diesel-electric power supply also generates far too high a thermal signature to be safe from air and artillery direction, and its transformer/diode-stabilization arrangement for the DC supply is far too noisy as regards avoidance of detection.
 

The air conditioning is not powerful enough for the general Middle East situation, and often this has to be modified in the field, resulting in a not very satisfactory situation regarding fitting, local supplies and maintenance. If these missile units are dug in or heavily camouflaged, the situation is made far worse as regards the intense concentration needed for hours of alert war action against aircraft intrusion. Heat exhaustion is common in foul air conditions inside operator shacks. There have been a considerable number of examples in the Middle East of crews fainting and being sick in enclosed vehicle spaces with no proper air conditioning in high temperatures. Russian ventilation equipment is also notoriously bad, and in tanks it always has been. Fan equipment and air conditioning in general are inadequate. Part of the problem is that Russian design is European-oriented, necessarily. This means to use a British term, that vehicles and equipment given to Arab armies not properly tropicalised. Computer panels in particular suffer from such conditions as here described, being subject to corrosion through bad air conditioning, high temperatures, and condensation which in armoured enclosures is always a problem, given the almost submarine conditions.
 

The Israelis of course are at an advantage here because their equipment (particularly tanks) is produced in-house and well-tested.
 

Of course all this kit has to be maintained, inspected and repaired when necessary. Middle East electricians and mechanics suffer from uncertainties and vagaries of Russian-built in-field test-equipment. The manuals are badly translated, and calibration procedures in many cases are somewhat obscure and uncertain, and the nomenclature confusing. It goes without saying that wi-fi has hardly arrived yet in the Russia technical head, never mind the Middle Eastern head. The result is that the many local attempts at remedying this situation produce ill-matched local modifications which are essays in technical bafflement.
In operation the missile tactical team has to make quick decisions within the rapidly-changing air situation, and this is the weak link. Interpretation of the situation as regards interception and reading of several levels of information is something of an art form, even for highly trained Western operators. The British Army’s Clansman radio system is a case in point.

Command and control of combined missile forces is another problem, particularly if friendly assets are in the interception dimension. The Arabs tend not to trust individual decision making, and the chain of command in the field is bureaucratic to a fault. As with their artillery practices, they like to fire in salvo, and this is not what successful missile operation is all about.

If the truth were told, the Russians are fielding equipment far too quickly before proper development and testing has been carried out.

A high radar return manoeuvring often supersonically in three dimensions requires tremendous state of the art computing power to track and intercept. When that target is putting out every single defence, including chaff, thermal flares, counter-electronics and indeed counter-radar missiles plus good old-fashioned homing smart munitions, then AA missile defence is still very much a hit and miss affair. The Russian AA is very much inferior to even the US Patriot AA units of fifteen years ago, whose performance left much to be desired. The two successful U-2 interceptions (Russia and Cuba in the early 1960s) were against a very slow-moving aircraft which had almost no manoeuvrability at all.

Another problem is with crews. The equipment is as good as the operators. The Arabs do not excel in the kind of training requiring for quick technical reaction and interpretation. Neither do their repair and maintenance procedures match the West. These AA units require very high maintenance and re-calibration schedules, particularly in field operation, and often the indigenous trainees are not up it after their Russian instructors have left for home. The supply of Russian spare parts is as usual with Communist traditions, not good at all.

The Arab forces are far better off with low-tech low-cost infantry weapons. They gave the Israelis a bloody nose in 1973 with cheap anti-tank TOW weapons. The same thing happened in the last Lebanon campaign when the Israeli army (which had not fought an armoured battle proper for THIRTY years!) got another small-scale set-back though the Arab use of guided anti-tank weapons which peasant infantryman could learn how to use and maintain in approximately one hour. These weapons actually defeated the mighty Merkava MK IV, boasted by Israel as the best tank in the world.
 

Strategically the Arab armed forces will never be a match for the Western equivalent. But when they fight on terms they thoroughly understand, they are masters of combat. As we know, guerrilla warfare is their métier. So are their political and propaganda skills, just as important as any weapon.
Their talent for  propaganda has  been shown by the recent Columbia visit. They are learning how to play the propaganda game against weak-minded Western liberals, who just as in 1939, have no fucking idea of what they are up against.

Colin Bennett