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The V Weapons Part 1 from After The Battle 6
By 1942, the German High Command were intensely promoting the Wehrmacht project for a liquid-fuelled rocket, being developed at Peenemunde in North Germany on the Baltic coast. The Luftwaffe protested that the Army were sprouting wings, and that such bombardment would be undertaken by the Army. The Luftwaffe, lacking a suitable heavy bomber to bomb London, therefore set their hopes on a small expendable pilotless aircraft, the size of a small fighter with a range of up to 160 miles carrying a warhead of 1 ton, which was to be developed by the firm of Gerhard Fieseler. The engine was to be based on Dr. Paul Schmidt's pulse-jet unit, which he had been developing since 1929 at Munich. Air entered the jet intake, opening in the process a loose flap. Low octane petrol was ignited in it-the explosion closed the flap and the exhaust gas pushed the aircraft ahead, whereupon the slipstream opened the intake and the cycle repeated itself. The intermittent operation of the engine gave the V1 its characteristic throbbing noise.
The engine was produced by Argus Motorenwerke. The Airframe was designed by Robert Lusser of the Gerhard Fieseler. aircraft firm. At a conference on June-19, 1942, top priority was given to the project as it was seen that its simple design (it only had to have a life of about 30 minutes) was ideally suited for mass production at low cost. Production was to be at the rate of 3,000 flying bombs per month spread between 17 centres throughout Germany with a major part concentrated in the Volkswagen factory at KdF Stadt near Fallersleben. Radio control was rejected since it could be jammed, and steering was effected by a triple-axis Askania gyroscope coupled to a magnetic compass. After a predetermined interval of flight, fuel would be shut off and the craft would descend. Its drawback was that it` couldn't take off under its own power and had to be assisted by being catapulted from a 230ft. ramp.
On December 24, 1942 the first flying, bpmh made a successful catapult launch and: flew over 11/2 miles.
The commencement of the attack was set for a year ahead - Christmas 1943. Only the method of launching was in debate. Feldmarschlall Milch, of the German Air Ministry, preferred a limited number of giant bomb proof combined storage and launching bunkers, from which an unremitting fire could be carried on against England. Generalleutnant Walter von Axthelm, on the other-hand, felt the constructions would be bombed before they were completed, and suggested instead that a hundred or more small mobile-sites would be better, as it was doubtful if the enemy would be able to destroy them all. In the event no clear decision was made and both kind of constructions were started. It was also planned to air-launch bombs from Heinkel He IIls.
The first of the field-firing units, codenamed, Flakregiment 155 (W), was formed on August 15, 1943 under Colonel Max Wachtel. However, delays caused by insufficient supplies of flying bombs for testing, bombing of the Fieseler factory, shortage of labour, defective quality of the bomb's construction and 150 modifications (not many, compared with the 65,000 necessary for the V2 rocket) put back the commencing date. Failures in test launches were so great that by November 1943, it was necessary to scrap all the wings and centre sections produced by Volkswagen and start again. Below left: Flight Officer Constance Babbington-Smith, one of the photointerpreters at Medmenham, points out the V1 she identified on a launching ramp at Peenemunde (Associated Press). Right: The V1 arrowed on the ramp (IWM).
Production plans had to be revised and the rate was to rise from 1,400 bombs in January 1944 to 8,000 in September. Hitler then issued revised orders for the commencement of the attack-first February 15, then his own birthday in April, then to coincide with the expected invasion of Europe. Although by March, Colonel Wachtel's firing units, in France since December, were ready to launch their first flying bombs, supplies of bombs were non existent. The invasion of France came on June 6, but not until June 12 was he able to issue the order to open fire on London with an all-catapult synchronised launch at 11.18 p.m. With a range of 130 miles. impact time would be 11.40 p.m. – the aiming point, Tower Bridge.
The “Ski-Type” Launching Sites
As we have seen, Generalleutnant Axthelm was in favour of spreading the launching of the VI over as many sites as possible. By September 23, 1943, fifty-eight of the first sixty-four sites were nearing completion together with a further thirty-two reserve sites all spread throughout Picardy, Artois and Normandy about fifteen miles from the coast. It had been known in Britain, since 1942, that the Germans were working on some sort of secret weapon, and in September 1943 a French agent, Michel Hollard, working for British intelligence, sent in a report through Switzerland stating that some sort of new constructions were being carried out in six places: Bonnetot le Faubourg, Auffray, Totes, Ribeaucourt, Maison Ponthieu and Bois Carre. He was immediately asked to try to obtain more information. He infiltrated an agent, Andre Comps, into the Bois Carre site as a draughtsman, who managed to make copies of the blueprints, one of which had to be 'borrowed' from the pocket of the German foreman. When these plans reached England, they formed the basis for target models, as each site had the same basic features. The ski-shaped buildings, so designed to offer protection from blast for the storage of unassembled flying bombs, and also as a shelter for personnel whilst the bomb was launched, gave the sites their name. By this time specially flown sorties had provided photographs of the six sites. These were taken to the RAF air reconnaissance interpretation unit at Medmenham, Buckinghamshire. There, two interpreters, Captain Neil Simon and Captain Robert Rowell, puzzled over the pictures-each site appeared to have nine buildings with three constructed like skis on their side. The most advanced site was the one at Bois Carre-'the square wood', near Yvrench. A top level meeting was held on November 8, and two weeks later after photographs of the whole of Northern France had been re-examined, ninety-five sites had been located in various stages of construction. A sketch had been made by a Dane walking on the island of Bornholm in the Baltic, which had been sent to London in August, of a small crashed aeroplane without a cockpit. Similar little winged aircraft on ramps had been spotted at a Luftwaffe testing site at Peenemunde West (the first by Flight Officer Babington Smith on December 1, 1943). The picture was at last beginning to fit together. On December 4, the whole of Northern France was re-photographed to make sure no site had been overlooked and the next day fighter-bombers began attacks on the sites. On December 24, 672 Fortresses of the US Eighth Air Force attacked 24 sites. Altogether 52 sites were attacked in December, the
British estimated that 21 sites had been destroyed and fifteen damaged-in reality only seven had been put out of action. However, the attacks continued, and the German programme of construction was seriously impeded. By the end of January, 25 per cent of the sites had been put out of action, and of the 35,000 French workers on the sites, some 20,000 had run away. It was obvious to Colonel Wachtel that sooner or later, all the sites which were easily recognisable from the air, would be destroyed. On January 23, Generalleutnant von Axthelm informed Feldmarschall Milch of a change of plan.
Soon after taking up his appointment of command of LXV ARMEE KORPS in December 1943, General Heinemann made a tour of the proposed V1 launching sites. He thought that the ski sites were unnecessarily elaborate, easy to identify from the air with their distinctive buildings, vulnerable to air attack and, being constructed by French labour, every site probably swarming with potential spies. When he was told that supplies of bombs would be delayed until May or June, he decided that the intervening months could be well spent in constructing a new kind of launching site, which the RAF subsequently called ‘modified sites'. These consisted of a metal ramp which could be manufactured off-site and bolted on to previously prepared foundations which were easily concealed in forests. No ski buildings were to be constructed, only three or four camouflaged huts. Using 10,000 workers, the Germans could build fifty sites a month. The prefabricated catapults would only be transported to the site just before the offensive was due to commence-only six days were needed to assemble the sections on the previously prepared foundations. Although from the end of February 1944, the ski sites would be obsolete, it was planned to make it look as if they were being repaired to mislead British Intelligence. In this General Heinemann was successful. Only German and convict labour was employed on the modified sites. A hundred and fifty sites were planned and about half this number were operational when the VI attacks commenced in June. The first site to be discovered was at Belhamelin, near Cherbourg, late in April, and by June 12, sixty-six had been identified. However, the impending invasion had bombing priority, and the Allied Expeditionary Air Force attached little importance to the new sites which were unimpressive and would prove difficult to locate and destroy. Whereas the ski sites had received 23,196 tons of bombs, only one modified site had received one unsuccessful attack by fighter bombers on May 27. Then on June 10 an agent reported to London that he had seen a train of thirty-three wagons each carrying three long objects pass through Ghent. These were interpreted correctly as flying bombs. New reconnaissance of some of the sites not photographed since June 4 because of bad weather, revealed much activity, with ramps and rails in position. In fact by the 12th, fifty-four sites had been fitted with the launching mechanism. Although on June 12 it was intended that the first bombs should fall on London at 11.40 p. m., fifteen minutes before they were due to fire not one site was ready, and Colonel Wachtel had to delay the salvo. In the end only ten bombs were fired, five of which crashed almost immediately. One probably crashed in the Channel, the remaining four reached Southern England. The first landed at Gravesend at 4.18 a.m. The only bomb to cause any casualties was the one than landed at Bethnal Green, killing six people. The Germans had sent out a reconnaissance plane with these first VIs, but it was shot down, and so denied the Germans accurate information on their performance. After this disastrous start, Colonel Wachtel postponed further firings until June 15. By then, better acquainted with the problems of this new form of warfare, and well supplied with bombs and fuel, a salvo was fired at 10.00 p.m. that evening. The Germans managed to get away 244 bombs by noon on June 16, of which forty-five crashed soon after launching. Others were shot down by anti-aircraft guns and fighters, only 73 reaching Greater London.
On the morning of June 16 1945, it was announced in Parliament that a new form of warfare had begun. Various steps were taken to counteract the VI. Belts of anti-aircraft guns using the new proximity fuse, gun-laying radar, balloons, standing patrols by fighters, and attacks on the French storage depots, all helped to reduce the number of bombs reaching England. The fastest fighters employed at first were Tempest Vs, Spitfire XIVs and Mustang IIIs, with Mosquitos flying at night. The most severe incidents occurred at the Air Ministry in the Strand on June 28, killing 198 people; July 2 at Chelsea, where 124 people lost their lives, culminating in the worst at East Barnet on August 23 with 211 people killed. Not until the launching sites were overrun by troops advancing across France was the offensive diminished. The last ground-launched VI from France reached England on September 1; thereafter air launches continued using specially converted He llls. 8892 bombs had been ramp launched, and when the launch sites were overrun a further 1600 bombs were launched from the air from the He IIIs.
Of the total of 10,492 bombs launched, nearly 3000 failed to reach England through mechanical and other defects; a further 4000 were destroyed by the defences (exact figures were Fighters 1847, Guns 1878, Balloons 231), and 3531 eluded the defences. Of these only 2419 reached the London Civil Defence Region. The aiming point, Tower Bridge, was unscathed!
We illustrate a modified site from which Vls were actually launched, one near the Somme region.The metal ramps were removed from all the sites for scrap, and many enquiries in all areas of France to find a site with the ramps still standing proved fruitless. The sites are dramatic perhaps because of their inconspicuousness. Firing cabins remain ffom where the button was pressed, and it is still possible to see where the ramps were fixed to the ground. At the Montaigu site, the nonmagnetic square for setting up the gyrocompass remains undamaged, bearing 300 degrees. The ramp supports at Chausse Tirancourt bear 320 degrees, the direction of London.
http://www.thisfrenchlife.com/thisfrenchlife/2004/04/eurostar_tribut.html
Andre Comps plans went to the highest level in London-to Lord Cherwell, Scientific adviser to Winston Churchill, and the latter, although not mentioning him by name, wrote of Hollard's work to President Roosevelt on October 25, 1943. There is no doubt that the information he and his agents provided made a positive contribution to delaying the start of the flying bomb offensive and saved thousands of lives in the process. He was captured by the Germans in February 1944, and on his release from Neuengamme concentration camp, was awarded the Distinguished Service Order the highest British military decoration for which a foreigner is eligible.
Part 2: London Under Fire to follow
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