Olsen: And what kind of contact did you have with them? Did they come a recruit you or talk to you?

STURGIS: No sir. You have got to remember that I was in touch with these people from 1957 to 1958.

Olsen: What kind of contact did you have with them in 1957 and 1958?

STURGIS: Working with them in the overthrow of the Batista government.

Olsen: What did you do to work with them in the overthrow of the Batista government?

STURGIS: Smuggled guns, equipment. I was up in the mountains with Fidel, fought in several battles with the rebel forces in the mountains. Again, we brought Clark Wollan into the picture. And so up the line to the embassy.

Olsen: What I am trying to get at here is, did these Sengenes family members have any role in this other than as CIA agents, or were they revolutionaries themselves intent upon overthrowing the Batista government?

STURGIS: Right, sir, yes, sir. Their position at a latter date got to be very important, the fact that they were recruited to be agents for Central Intelligence Agency.

Olsen: When were they recruited to be agents for the CIA?

STURGIS: I would believe the year 1959, if not already 1958, which I am not sure.

Roethe: And what was their position outwardly? They were not card carrying CIA people, I presume, they must have had some position in the Miami community.

STURGIS: Well, these people were top leaders in the revolution. And remember, they did have contact with the past government of Batista, in the government, the top people, and also with the new government to be, which was the 26th of July Fidel Castro outfit. They worked very well into that. You have got to understand their background a little bit. The Sangenes family years back were involved in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in Spain. They were young people at that time. They thought the Communist ideology -- from what I understand from them, they thought that was the thing in those days. So naturally, they broke away from the Communists themselves. And they were very intelligent people. And these are the type of people, with the position that they were in, the intelligence that they have, that the American Government would like to have as agents.

Olsen: But your contact with them in 1957 and 1958 --

STURGIS: Was strictly revolutionary.

Olsen: Was strictly revolutionary?

STURGIS: Yes sir.

Olsen: They were not, as far as you know, at that time, associated with the CIA?

STURGIS: As far as I know.

Olsen: As far as you know?

STURGIS: I did not know if they were or were not.

Olsen: You had no indication, then, that they were?

STURGIS: No indication.

Olsen: So it was not until after you came back from Cuba in 1959 and made contact with them again that you believed that they were agents of the CIA?

STURGIS: Right, yes, sir.

Olsen: What did they say or do at that time to lead you to believe that they were agents of the CIA?

STURGIS: Well, number one, the activity that was going on in the Miami area, not only my activity, (illegible) one in the same position that I had, the comings and goings of people in and out of Cuba. Mrs. Geraldine Shamma, whom I recruited as an agent for the Embassy, was traveling from Havana to Miami. And she had a home on Brickell Avenue, which was a safe house for the CIA. The Cubans who came from Havana would come to the safe house which she maintained herself with her own money, not CIA money, her own money. BERNARD BARKER would call her up, and she would tell him who was there, and he would come over to pick up these Cuban exiles to be sent over to be interrogated or debriefed. This is what BERNARD BARKER would do. And E. HOWARD HUNT, I believe, may have come over there. I don't think he did, but anyway, she met him traveling back and forth from Havana, where she met him, I don't know off hand. You would have to ask her.

Olsen: You mean you have subsequently heard or learned that she did possibly had some contact with HUNT?

STURGIS: Oh, I knew that for years, because, remember, I was in Brickell Avenue in Miami, too.

Olsen: What was the address now?

STURGIS: It is torn down now. I forget the address. They may be able to remember the address.

Olsen: How did you know that this was a CIA safe house?

STURGIS: Well, again, the top military commanders who were in Cuba were in exile, and had meetings (illegible) this was when the CIA started to get the Cubans together to form the nucleus of an invasion force that was to go to Latin America to train. So there was a lot of activity, a lot of activity.

Olsen: Didn't that begin in 1960?

STURGIS: I would say that we had the house there in 1960, yes. And we were in touch with various agents, BARKER, for one. I was in touch with Sam, and also the other Sangenes. Louis Sangenes had an office in downtown Miami that was part of a recruiting office that he had prior to the invasion.

Olsen: FRANK, I was asking you a little while ago what the members of the Sangenes family said or did to lead you to conclude that they were agents of the Central Intelligence Agency? You told me that one of the women you had recruited in Cuba on behalf of the American Embassy there lived in a CIA safe house in Miami. But I am not sure whether you answered the question that I put to you. How did you know that the Sangenes family members were agents of the CIA?

STURGIS: I am not sure whether Sam told me at that period that he was working with the company or not, I am not sure, because I can't pin down the date. But he told me he was working ---

Olsen: Which one of the Sangenes family members was it that was called Sam Jennis?

STURGIS: That is Joaquim Sangenes. My understanding through the years is that he got to hold a high position with the CIA.

Olsen: Was Sangenes on the same level or subordinate to BERNARD BARKER?

STURGIS: Well you must understand that EDUARDO at that time was a political officer.

Olsen: You are talking about beginning sometime in 1960?

STURGIS: Right. And BARKER'S position with EDUARDO was as his assistant. So that means BARKER at that time was involved with the political officers, working for a political officer, which was political.

Olsen: And when you say political, what was EDUARDO doing, what were EDUARDO and BARKER doing at that time as political officers?

STURGIS: I can tell you what EDUARDO was doing, even though I didn't meet him, because I knew BARKER'S activities. BARKER was -- if EDUARDO wanted to have a meeting with Tony Varona -- he was the President of the Revolutionary Council that was formed by CIA.

Olsen: What was that called, the Cuban Revolutionary Council?

STURGIS: No, sir, that was called the Cuban Revolutionary Council, but it had other names that are in Spanish, Miro Cardona, was part of that.

Olsen: I am going to ask you to give me some names of the leaders of the Cuban Revolutionary organizations--

STURGIS: Council.

Olsen: --in Miami in 1959, 1960 and 1961. Miro Cardona, right?

STURGIS: I believe Miro Cardona was the President of the Council. Tony Varona. He was the Secretary General of the Council. Well, Manuel Artime, was part of that. He was part of the council. There has been a lot of writing which (illegible) about his position. They call Artime the leader of the invasion brigade. That is not so. Manuel Artime's position was, he was the coordinator between the political group of the Revolutionary Council -- the Revolutionary Council was a political force with the brigade, which was the military force. And because of him being who he was and his contacts, they made him like, I would say, a liaison between both the Brigade and the Revolutionary Council. He was not the leader of the invasion.

Olsen: Who else was at the top of the Revolutionary Council?

STURGIS: San Roman.

Olsen: Is that his last name?

STURGIS: S-A-M R-O-M-A-N.

Olsen: And was he just one of the members of the Revolutionary Council or the leaders?

STURGIS: Yes sir, he was one of the leaders of the Revolutionary Council. And you must remember, the Revolutionary Council was going to be the governing body of a new government in Cuba.

Olsen: Yes, I understand. It is worth at this point naming a few of the other very prominent people who were members of the Revolutionary Council which was going to form the nucleus of the new government if Castro was overthrown?

STURGIS: Let me say this here. There was a lot of dissention that was going on in the Revolutionary Council. There was a power struggle within the Council. You had another member who was outside the Revolutionary Council that they had wanted in. And this is very important. President Kennedy -- I think it was Bobby Kennedy -- either President Kennedy or Bobby Kennedy insisted that this man had to go into this Revolutionary Council. That man did not have an organization in Cuba, this man supposedly had only a nucleus of a handful of revolutionaries -- which caused a big uproar, and changes a lot of things.

Olsen: Who was this that the Kennedys wanted in?

STURGIS: Dr. Manolo Ray, who was considered very much to the left. This created such a turmoil. He was leftist, and his thoughts and thinking were like Fidel Castro's.

Navarro: In Cuba he was a commander for the Castro Army. And he was one of the ministers for the Castro Government.

Olsen: Why did he go to Florida?

STURGIS: Again, Fidel had a power struggle in Cuba where you had the anti-Communists against Fidel himself, and the Fidel Castro government. At that time it was not said that it was a Communist government, but it was a pink type government. You had power struggles within the government. For instance, Commander Camelo Cienfuegos, I believe because of his contact with me, was executed by Fidel Castro. And people like Manolo Ray, who were on the left, were against the Communists.

Olsen: Anyway, you advise us that the insistence of one or both of the Kennedy's created a major uproar in the Revolutionary Council because --

STURGIS: And in the Brigade. Because you must remember, Mr. Olsen, that CIA had direct contact, the political sector of CIA, in which HOWARD HUNT as EDUARDO, was a high ranking political officer with the Revolutionary Council. Then, you had a separate group which was the Brigade. HOWARD HUNT had nothing to do with the Brigade. It was a separate section of the CIA. And then, you had a third separation which was Operation Forty, which was a Top Secret operation. And the head of Operation Forty was Sam Jennis. The second chief --

Olsen: Who headed the Brigade?

STURGIS: The head of the Brigade was Orncido Oliva. He is a colonel in the National Guard.

Olsen: And what was the nature of Operation Forty?

STURGIS: Operation Forty was a CIA Top Secret operation. They were to train, I believe, approximately 200 Cubans who were in the Army. They were officers --

Olsen: That is the American Army?

STURGIS: The American Army, who went and received training in the American Army as officers. Their main job was intelligence. These men were going to be used to infiltrate Cuba to make contact with the underground.

Olsen: Which one of the Sangenes family members headed Operation Forty?

STURGIS: Sam Jennis was the head of the Operation. The second chief of Operation Forty was Felipe Gutierrez.

Olsen: All three of these different operations were essentially being organized by the CIA, weren't they?

STURGIS: Yes sir. If you remember, every one including the President of the U.S. denied that the CIA was behind more funding or training of these people. But they were in fact being what they were supposed to be, U.S. Government operations.

Olsen: It is your testimony, FRANK, that the Revolutionary Council was being financially supported by and organized by the CIA with E. HOWARD HUNT, otherwise know at that time as being EDUARDO, being the chief CIA agent involved in setting up the Revolutionary Council?

STURGIS: Let me correct you a little bit there. He was one of the high political officers of the CIA that was involved in the organization of the Revolutionary Council.

Olsen: And who was it from the CIA who was heading up the training and the organizing and the funding, financing, and what not, of the Brigade?

STURGIS: Well, the funding naturally again was CIA, funding for Operation Forty was CIA. The training for Operation Forty was U.S. Army and CIA. Mr. Frank Bender, which is a code name for Mr. Drecher, is his real name, who was the top CIA official who was in charge of the CIA operation in South Florida for this mess.

Olsen: The whole thing?

STURGIS: Yes.

Olsen: Was Mr. Drecher's real first name FRANK also?

STURGIS: I don't know, sir. He is, I believe, of German extraction, if I am not mistaken. He was a naturalized citizen, he was not born in this country.

Olsen: Do you know whether he is still with the Agency?

STURGIS: I don't know sir.

Olsen: And who was the chief CIA officer having supervisory responsibilities or major responsibility for Operation Forty?

STURGIS: I couldn't go over Sam Jennis myself.

Olsen: But you don't know who it was?

STURGIS: All I knew who was above him was Frank Bender, whom I have never met.

Olsen: Did you meet other people who were, let's say, non-Cubans, who were involved in the planning with respect to the operation that finally ended up with the Bay of Pigs?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

Olsen: Who else did you meet?

STURGIS: I would have to look through my notes and get you the names.

Olsen: You don't remember any right off hand here now?

STURGIS: Well, there was one man, I can't tell you his name, but he had one arm, and he was a colonel in the French Foreign Legion. He had this home which I had visited several times. I think it was in Coconut Grove. And he was a CIA official. And I believe I do have his name sir, in my notes.

Olsen: Now, what part did you play, FRANK, in this whole operation that led to the Bay of Pigs?

STURGIS: Well, I will have to go back again to Geraldine Shamma at Brickel Avenue. My contact with all the same top military commanders that were in Cuba both in the Army and in the Air Force who were in exile. Geraldine's contact with the head of the underground organization inside of Cuba, with Francisco, whose real name I will give you, but I forget it off hand. Her contact here in Brickel Avenue with BARKER and HUNT. And my association, naturally, with Sam Jennis, who at a later date, when I told him that BARKER wanted me to help him in some of his work, and BARKER, not knowing that I had contact, or was working with Sam Jennis, of course, you have got to understand, a lot of these top people that were in exile who at a later date were involved in the Congo who were friends of mine who were CIA agents. And those were the agents when they came into exile.

I know this is off the track, Mr. Olsen, but it is going to be very important. You have got to understand that you have the same -- not all the Cubans, now, I am talking about -- you have the same nucleus of the Cubans who came over here in the beginning, not every one, but the nucleus of them who were in Cuba with Batista, who were associated with the gambling casinos, the crime syndicate, the American crime syndicate, which in turn controlled the Cuban crime syndicate because all Cubans are not bad, but there was a Cuban crime syndicate. These same people, because of the people they knew with Batista, because of the people that they knew in Cuba, they not only supported Batista, but those same people did support the new Castro government, and got themselves in as a safeguard that if the rebels did succeed, at least they had contact. And they did give money and they did give information and so forth, to these people. And some of them were involved in drugs and crime and what have you.

Olsen: When you say these people, who are the people you are talking about?

STURGIS: I can't put my finger on it, Mr. Olsen. But as we go along -- I am going to jump again -- I have seen this myself, the same people who participated, some of them who participated in the Bay of Pigs invasion, were people who were considered Batistanos, some of them. Now, the Batistanos who supported Batista weren't all bad, but these same people who came over here and were recruited by the CIA, and worked here as agents, and some as double agents. Because of their criminal activities, a lot of information was gotten out of Cuba, because of the contacts.

Olsen: Were any of these people among the leaders of the Cuban Revolutionary Council?

STURGIS: No, I would think they were outside of the Revolutionary Council.

Olsen: Were any of these people among the leaders of the Brigade?

STURGIS: Some were suspected of being double-agents in the Brigade. But then again, you must understand that the Brigade itself, or persons in the Brigade was not a CIA agent, even though the Brigade was recruited from the Cuban colony to fight its soldiers. So that doesn't make them CIA agents, that makes them a force being financed and trained, and their families being paid monies while they were training, and away from home, and fighting, and even while they were in Cuba as prisoners their families were still receiving money from the CIA.

Olsen: Were any of the Batista clan, let's call them, who were among the leaders of Operation Forty?

STURGIS: Yes sir.

Olsen: Who among the leadership of Operation Forty?

STURGIS: Felipe Guiterrez, the second chief of Operation Forty, was a G-2 agent under Batista, a high ranking officer.

Olsen: Was he someone who had close connections with the crime syndicate in Cuba?

STURGIS: I don't know that much about it. But there was a hatred between the second chief of Operation Forty and Sam Jennis, who was the chief of Operation Forty. Each one accused the other, from my information, of being a double agent, while being a CIA agent.

Olsen: Can you name for us a few of the top people who you felt or believed at that time to be persons who had close connections with the Cuban and American underground syndicate -- underworld syndicate?

STURGIS: Senator or ex-Senator Rolando Masferrer. I have something in there that I would like to give you so that you will know his whole background. And then another Senator who at one time was involved in drugs -- I can't think of his name. Masferrer was called El Tigre, the tiger. He was a Senator under Batista, an ex-Communist, and an ex-member of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in Spain. He owns a newspaper in Miami called Libertad. And he was very much in touch with the crime syndicate, the American crime syndicate in Havana, plus the Cuban crime syndicate. Anyway, Senator Masferrer, because of his loyalty to General Batista, under the protection and auspices of General Batista, formed army of approximately 2,000 men, a private army, which supposedly was like the muscles of Batista. If Batista wanted to get rid of any of his enemies, Masferrer was there to do the muscle work. He kept the heat off the G-2, which was the Cuban Intelligence Service. I would say many of the ex-Senators that came into exile during Batista's time had contact with the U.S. underworld. This one man, this one Senator, I am trying to remember his name, was involved so much with the U.S. underworld and drugs that the American Government at one time threatened Batista to stop the sale of all legal drugs into Cuba because of this man. And this man today is living in Miami Beach.

Olsen: Is he the Senator whose name you are trying to remember?

STURGIS: Yes. And a very wealthy man.

Navarro: He is the closest friend of President Prio.

STURGIS: Very close to ex-President Carlos Prio.

Olsen: Let's move on from that subject here now to a further exploration of what you did during this period leading up to the Bay of Pigs. Did you operate with the Revolutionary Council?

STURGIS: I had contact with the Revolutionary Council.

Olsen: Did you have contact with Operation Forty.

STURGIS: Yes, sir, I did.

Olsen: And did you have contact with the Brigade?

STURGIS: No sir, not with the Brigade in general. What I did do is, many of the Brigade members -- not many, but some of the Brigade members -- did live at my home. I had a home at Southwest 60th Court.

Olsen: What role did you play in that organization?

STURGIS: Intelligence, training, I did train some of the Brigade members in the Everglades. And I have pictures of the training camp. As a matter of fact, one of the persons I did train is the Vice Mayor of Miami, Manolo Rebozo. I trained many of the intelligence teams for the Brigade.

Olsen: Did you get paid for this activity?

STURGIS: I did not get paid by CIA.

Olsen: Did you get paid by anybody?

STURGIS: Can we just leave that alone right there?

Olsen: You are at liberty at any time, FRANK, to not go into some subject if you don't want to. But the important thing for us here is, we want to find of whether the CIA has been involved in any improper domestic activities in the U.S., and that is why we want, if we can, to get you to discuss as openly with us as possible what your connection with the CIA was.

STURGIS: Well, it is going to be very difficult, Mr. Olsen, for me to really tell you what my connections with the CIA are, because I have nothing to show. But in the record there are documents, CIA documents and memoranda, that show that, for instance, John Dean at the Watergate hearing -- some of the documents, and so forth, CIA documents -- John Dean made a telephone call to Mr. Schlesinger, who at the time was Director of the CIA --

Olsen: Hold up, if you will, right here, FRANK. I want you to tell me not what came out in Watergate hearings from somebody else, I want you to tell me what your relationship was down there as you knew it.

STURGIS: Well, I was associated with the CIA.

Olsen: But I want to know exactly what that association was.

STURGIS: Well, that is what I am trying to put in perspective.

Olsen: I want to have you lay out the facts as clearly as you possibly can lay them out to us, pinpointing as accurately as you possibly can, what your connection with the CIA was during the period of time that the Bay of Pigs operation was being planned and carried out.

STURGIS: Okay. At one period -- and I can't remember the date, I am not sure whether it was before the Bay of Pigs or after the Bay of Pigs -- one of the CIA agents wanted me to assist him.

Olsen: Who is that?

STURGIS: BERNARD L. BARKER. I made contact with Sam, and Sam says, help him.

Olsen: When you say Sam, are you talking about Sam Jennis?

STURGIS: Yes. The idea was FRANK, there are groups here that are breaking the law. We don't want to upset the apple cart in Cuba. You will have to help me, because of many groups, revolutionary groups are breaking the law.

Olsen: So BARKER approached you?

STURGIS: Right.

Olsen: And what did he approach you for?

STURGIS: Well, there was an operation in effect where a F-4U -- I believe it was an F4U -- Navy fighter plane was bought by some Americans to be used in a bombing raid over Cuba, most likely Havana -- that is the oil refineries.

Olsen: Can I interrupt just a second? That was after the Bay of Pigs, wasn't it?

STURGIS: I am not sure whether it was before or after.

Olsen: Go ahead.

STURGIS: The only way you can find out about that is, I will give you the name, and if you can get in touch with the party, I believe he may have records, I don't know, because my records were destroyed.

Olsen: Anyway, BARKER wanted you to try to give him some help in cooling the thing, is that it?

STURGIS: Yes sir. I told BARKER that I would see what I can do. I made contact with Sam Jennis, and told him what BARKER, as friend of mine, wanted me to do. And he said for me to go and help BARKER.

Olsen: And did you then do some investigation?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

Olsen: Did you come up with anything?

STURGIS: I sure did.

Olsen: Did you pass that on to BARKER?

STURGIS: Yes sir. I took him to where the airplane was hidden in a hanger and being worked on and ready for a bombing run over the oil refineries in Havana.

Olsen: And was that planned operation then aborted as a result?

STURGIS: It was broken up, and I believe the airplane was confiscated, through the channels, proper channels. The man that was primarily involved in this thing, his name was Bill Johnson.

Olsen: And where was Bill Johnson from?

STURGIS: From Miami.

Olsen: Is he an American?

STURGIS: Yes sir, he is an American citizen. And he lives there today, and he has a business there in that area.

Olsen: Had he been employed to do this by Cuban revolutionaires, do you know?

STURGIS: No sir. He was a mercenary man that would contact Cuban groups and ask them for money, he would do certain things, and make flights, and so forth, over Cuba. I, a number of times, did seek to obtain Bill Johnson's help in the Bahama Islands for bases that were needed (illegible) bases in the Bahama Islands. And Bill did help me on a number of occasions as far as some air penetrations in Cuba. He dug up some pilots for me, not knowing or realizing, I believed, that I was connected with anybody in the CIA.

Olsen: Did you engage in any of this kind of activity yourself similar to what Bill Johnson did?

STURGIS: Yes, I went on a number of these flights.

Olsen: Did you consider yourself kind of a mercinary yourself?

STURGIS: No, sir.

Olsen: Who planned, organized, financed and otherwise involved you in these activities, then, that were directed at Cuba after the Bay of Pigs?

STURGIS: Well, you must remember that I had a position in Cuba with my friends who also had top positions even higher than my position. And I considered myself a revolutionary like them. I assisted my government and various agencies, including the CIA, with no salary in mind. At some time or another where CIA money was used -- for instance, the B-25, I flew with Pedro Diaz Lanz over the city of Havana on October 21, 1959, dropping several hundreds of thousands of leaflets over the city, over the Air Forces base.

Olsen: Who prepared those leaflets?

STURGIS: I had a home on Southwest 60 Court where Diaz Lanz and his two brothers and myself and other people, revoltionary Cubans, lived, and I had a secret printing machine that we printed these leaflets with.

Olsen: What other kind of projects ---

Roethe: Was this financed by the CIA, or at least do you believe it was?

STURGIS: Well, I cannot actually tell you that it was. Because at that period of time I did not know, even though we did have contact with the company. I cannot say, unless I see you as a CIA man give him money, I cannot say I saw him get money from the CIA.

Roethe: Was somebody financing this?

STURGIS: Certainly.

Roethe: And the financing was --

Olsen: Let me follow up on this if I may, Jim. Do you know who directly put up the money to finance that flight with the propaganda leaflets over Havana in October 1959?

STURGIS: October 21, 1959. The money for that operation, no, off hand I don't know directly where that money came from. You would have to ask Commander Pedro Diaz Lanz, or his brother, Marcos, Diaz Lanz.

Olsen: What other projects did you participate in directed at Cuba. Let's talk about after you left from Cuba now.

STURGIS: I did go to the Dominican Republic. I spoke several times with Raphael Trujillo, the President of the Dominican Republic.

Olsen: About what?

STURGIS: About giving help to Pedro Diaz Lanz. And he agreed to. Unfortunately, Pedro did not want to go the Dominican Republic. He stayed in Miami.

Olsen: And what else did you do in terms of activities directed at Cuba?

STURGIS: I went to Guatemala, and I spoke with the President of Guatemala, President Ydigoras.

Olsen: About the same thing, about assistance to Pedro Diaz Lanz?

STURGIS: Not only assistance, but also invasion bases, which President Ydigoras was giving to the Cubans for an invasion of Cuba.

Roethe: Who sponsored those trips?

STURGIS: I would have to think on that particular thing where the money was obtained.

Olsen: At whose request or suggestion did you go to Guatemala for that purpose?

STURGIS: I am not sure at this time.

Olsen: Can you tell us at whose suggestion or request you went to the Dominican Republic and talked to Trujillo?

STURGIS: I was at the Biltmore Terrace Hotel on Miami Beach -- I can't remember the year. But the man who was running, or at least one of the men who was running the Biltmore Terrace Hotel was Norman Rothman. That place was supposidely a hang out of all the top Batista people who came into exile. The top of the Biltmore Hotel was being readied for President Batista, who was in the Dominican Republic. I went to the Biltmore. And I was introduced to an intelligence agent who was a close buddy of General Trujillo's son, who I believe at the time was chief of the Air Force, the Dominican Air Force. This man asked me, or approached me in conversation and told me the General Trujillo would like to speak with the ex-Chief of Air Force, Pedro Diaz Lanz. And if I could make arrangements for the contact between him and Pedro, he would appreciate it. And I did make contact. And Pedro did not want to go to the Dominican Republic. So I said, I will go to the Dominican for you. And I did. And it was set up and arranged by this intelligence agent.

Olsen: The intelligence agent of ---

STURGIS: Trujillo. And I was received -- I had carte blanc in the Dominican Republic. I stayed at the top hotel there, I think it was called the Ambassador Hotel there in Santo Domingo. I was received at the palace. I went directly with this intelligence agent to the Presidential office. Trujillo was present in his white uniform. Johnny Abbes, as Chief of Intelligence, was there, a known past Communist, who I believe is still a Communist, or at least playing his little games.

Olsen: FRANK, can you tell me what other projects now you participated in that were directed against Cuba?

STURGIS: Well, I did a number of air and boat operations against Cuba that were not green light operations.

Olsen: Now, tell me what air operations you conducted?

STURGIS: Well, let me tell you the main ones, because I did so many that I couldn't pinpoint them all. One of the main operations -- well, Havana, October 21, 1959, which caused and created an international incident between the U.S. Government and the Cuban Government. A few months later relations were broken because of this incident, it was as excuse, between the governments, relations were completely broken. Another operation I did over the City of Havana with two aircraft, I dropped several hundred thousands of leaflets over that city.

Olsen: When was that?

STURGIS: I forget the date on that. I made a flight over Santiago De Cuba.

Olsen: For what purpose?

STURGIS: Leaflets. I made another flight into Las Villas Provence and dropped two underground agents into Las Villas Province with radio equipment.

Olsen: By parachute?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. I made another flight on the south coast of Pinar del Rio Province.

Olsen: For what purpose?

STURGIS: To drop some leaflets there. And I made some bombing runs over Nuevitas. And I dropped four bombs over the City of Nuevitas.

Olsen: What were you trying to hit?

STURGIS: Tobacco warehouses. The idea of that -- it sounds ridiculous -- but the idea of that was, as I made a number of penetrations by air and by boat -- and I thought they were ridiculous to do these things -- not all the operations I did were ridiculous, but from what Sam told me, the purpose of these operations was to test defenses, the radar defenses, their anti-aircraft defenses and their naval defenses. And I would fly in low and slow in a small aircraft, and not necessarily would I do all the trips, but I would organize these trips. And he preferred that I did not go on these trips, but I went.

Olsen: Who is he?

STURGIS: Sam Jennis. And I maintained a good leader of men must take risks.

Olsen: You mean he approved of these trips, but didn't like the idea of you doing it yourself, is that it?

STURGIS: Yes.

Olsen: At whose behest did you make these trips?

STURGIS: Well, most of them by Sam. You must understand this. Again, I will say, I don't know if I told you this on the record, that there are green light operations. A green light operation is an operation that all agencies are involved in. In other words, if the CIA wants to do an operation, especially if it is here in the U.S., for instance, like the Bay of Pigs invasion, every law in the book was broken, because they were smuggling refugees in and out of the countries, guns, explosives. My boat was used for infiltration into Cuba of guns and agents and explosives.

Olsen: In preparation for the Bay of Pigs?

STURGIS: Before and after the Bay of Pigs.

Olsen: What kind of boat did you have?

STURGIS: Well, I had four boats. It think it was a 63-foot Coast Guard cutter that we bought in Norfolk, Virginia. I bought another boat --

Olsen: When you say we bought that boat in Norfolk, Virginia, when was that bought?

STURGIS: Let me say, Pedro Diaz Lanz went down to Norfolk, Virginia, and put the money up, and so forth, and he and his brother and myself took it back from Norfolk, Virginia, and brought it down here to Miami.

Olsen: With what money did you buy it?

STURGIS: Again, I have a blank thing here in my mind at that particular time as to where that particular money came from.

Olsen: Who put the money up, Pedro Diaz Lanz.

STURGIS: He, himself? No. He was given money to buy all this equipment.

Olsen: But you don't know by whom?

STURGIS: Right now, no sir, I don't know who gave him the money for these boats.

Olsen: Anyway, did the boat get registered in your name?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

Olsen: This Coast Guard cutter?

STURGIS: Yes, sir, all four boats were registered in my name, the Coast Guard cutter, of which I have the pictures -- and I think I have the numbers on that.

Olsen: And what other boat do you have?

STURGIS: I have another boat, which was a 63 foot yacht called the Quesa.

Olsen: And who bought that boat?

STURGIS: Pedro Diaz Lanz and myself.

Olsen: Again, with money that you don't know the source of?

STURGIS: I can't think of it.

Olsen: What I am trying to do is speed up these things. I don't want to hear the story about each boat. I am trying to get at the guts of these things. What other boats did you have?

STURGIS: I had two 60-foot fiberglass boats that we bought from Bertram Yacht Company, two sixty footers that did approximately 50 miles an hour.

Olsen: These were power boats?

STURGIS: Power boats, yes sir.

Olsen: Private launchings, so to speak?

STURGIS: No, sir. I believe they were about -- I think they were maybe 16 feet wide and 30 feet wide.

Olsen: What were they being made for?

STURGIS: For infiltration in and out because of the speed, they did a top speed of fifty miles and hour.

Olsen: Were they manufactured expressly for you?

STURGIS: No, sir. These were new boats that Bertrams were bringing out of the yard as experimental for either racing or for anyone who wanted this type of a yacht for speed.

Roethe: Do you have any indication that any of these boats were paid for by CIA funds? Do you suspect or believe that they were?

STURGIS: Let me say this here. Again, the boats were used for infiltration, and there was CIA infiltration. Now, the person who can really get to the nitty gritty of boats, and so forth, is either Marcos Diaz Lanz -- and I will give you his address in Miami -- Pedro Diaz Lanz, I do not believe he is in Miami, he is the brother of Marcos, I believe that he is in Texas working as a fumigating pilot. And as a matter of fact, Pedro Diaz Lanz was very, very upset by the Bay of Pigs invasion. He was in charge of a special air group with the B-25 that was in my name. It failed, he told them it failed, he didn't like the operation. And he has got a dread, he is very paranoid, that the CIA wants to kill him. I think he is wrong. But unfortunately, I believe he is that paranoid in his mind, and he sees an agent behind every door that wants to kill him. But he has been in touch with the CIA.

Olsen: FRANK, you have mentioned the fact that you and Diaz Lanz, one of them at least, Pedro, acquired these boats, and that these boats were then used in certain operations directed at Cuba. What were these operations?

STURGIS: Infiltrations.

Olsen: When you say infiltrations, are you talking about putting people who are in Cuba?

STURGIS: And taking people out of Cuba, and bringing guns and equipment into Cuba.

Olsen: Now, when were these boats acquired, before the Bay of Pigs?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

Olsen: And were these trips into Cuba to bring people in, and to take people out of Cuba, and to run guns into Cuba, and so on, conducted both before and after the Bay of Pigs operation?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

Olsen: How long did they continue after the Bay of Pigs operation?

STURGIS: I don't know, sir. I cannot give you a date.

Olsen: Approximately.

STURGIS: The Bay of Pigs was 1961. Maybe 1962, 1963.

Olsen: Do you still have any of those boats?

STURGIS: No, sir.

Olsen: When were they disposed of?

STURGIS: I turned them over to Diaz Lanz, and Diaz Lanz in turn sold them.

Olsen: And you don't know what will happen to the proceeds?

STURGIS: Well, Diaz Lanz did take most of the proceeds, he gave his brother some, and as a matter of fact, he gave me a little bit, not much, but a little.

Olsen: Do you recollect how much he gave you?

STURGIS: On the boats I think maybe he might have given me a thousand dollars.

Olsen: Did you get all of the directions, and orders, and requests, to make these runs in to Cuba with the boat from Diaz Lanz, or did you get direction and orders from anybody else?

STURGIS: It was a combination. Understand, I did not want Pedro to know that I had contact with the people, because he trusted me explicitly.

Olsen: You didn't want him to know that you had contact with what people?

STURGIS: Well, for instance, I would make in a round-about way contact for Pedro with other Cuban people, different agencies and so forth.

Olsen: You have got me confused, now. I don't know what agencies or people you are talking about here now that you didn't want Pedro Diaz Lanz to know about.

STURGIS: I am getting a little ahead. For instance, if BARKER wanted to meet certain people, he would call me and say, FRANK, I would like to meet so and so, do you know him, or can you get contact with him? And I would say, yes, and then I would make contact and take these parties to BARKER to see what BARKER would want of the person.

Olsen: Did you ever get any directions with respect to any of these boat or air operations directed at Cuba from anybody else whom you knew was an official or agent of the CIA?

STURGIS: Let me say that I suspect, it will be an easier word for me.

Olsen: But none that you knew?

STURGIS: Let's say that I suspected of being a CIA agent, yes, I have received orders from them to do operations.

Olsen: But again FRANK, did you ever receive any directions or instructions or requests to conduct any of these boat or air operations against Cuba from somebody whom you knew to be an agent of the CIA? I will come back to the business of suspicion here later, but I first want to get an answer to that question.

STURGIS: Yes.

Olsen: Who?

STURGIS: Sam Jennis.

Olsen: Now, what operation or operations were you asked to conduct directed at Cuba by Sam Jennis?

STURGIS: I was asked to assist Conte Aguerro.

Olsen: You were asked to do what with respect to Dr. Conte Aguerro?

STURGIS: To assist him in air operations, that Conte Aguerro would get the money. And I was to organize an air group to do several air drops into Cuba, and pay the expenses and pay, not salaries, but pay the expenses for the operation.

Olsen: Were you then paid by Dr. Conte Aguerro?

STURGIS: Well, Dr. Conte Aguerro used to ask me, well, FRANK, what would it cost to organize and do an air lift raid over Cuba? And I would sit down with him and go over the figures of what I would have to do, and the money that would have to be laid out and so forth.

Olsen: And then did he pay for that?

STURGIS: He would give the money to me. For instance, I told him, here is a figure here, this, this, let's make a round figure of $5,000 to do air operations.

Olsen: But did he then pay you?

STURGIS: Yes he would give me the money, he never paid me.

Olsen: What is the difference between his paying you and giving you the money?

STURGIS: There is such a thing as, if you want to get paid, that means each week you get paid a set salary.

Olsen: If I sell you an automobile for $5,000 and you pay me $5,000 for that automobile, that doesn't mean you are going to do it every week, does it?

STURGIS: He is a good lawyer, I can't win that particular point with you. You are right.

Olsen: So he paid you the $5,000 or whatever the figure was whenever you did one of these projects for him?

STURGIS: Right.

Olsen: Did Sam Jennis put you in touch with him, or did he direct you to do this for him?

STURGIS: No, he directed me to do this to make contacts with Conte Aguerro, which I did. And evidently whatever progressed between them too, I did the operation.

Olsen: Did Sam Jennis have any occupation or function other than as an agent of the CIA?

STURGIS: To be very honest with you, I never asked him, I don't know.

Olsen: Do you have any reason to believe he was devoting 100 percent of his time to the CIA?

STURGIS: This would have lead me to believe that he was an official of the CIA. Now, Felix, or Felipe Gutierrez, I know he was in construction.

Olsen: And only maybe part -- maybe a part-time operative? Or was he an operative at all?

STURGIS: No, I believe his business -- everybody had to make a living -- unless you have something as a front.

Olsen: Did you feel that Gutierrez --- were you of the impression that he was a CIA agent?

STURGIS: Oh, yes, certainly. Like I say, I can't say, I can't put my finger on it and say, well, he is a hundred percent. I knew he was, because of my close connection with CIA people.

Olsen: Let me try and sum up something on kind of an overall basis and see if you can tell me that this is correct or incorrect, that during the years after you came back from Cuba in 1959, and for some few years thereafter, you have engaged in a number of operations involving Cuban exiles and Americans that were in one way or another directed at trying to subvert or overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

Olsen: That you did so under arrangements where you were asked sometimes to do something, and you would get paid for it?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

Olsen: Kind of a job-by-job basis, is that a fair statement?

STURGIS: Right.

Olsen: And is it a fair statement that at no time did you know that the money that was being paid to you was or was not CIA money?

STURGIS: Sometimes I did know it was CIA money.

Olsen: Now tell me when you knew it was CIA money.

STURGIS: When my B-25 bomber was at the Miami International Airport to be ready for operation, or to be operational, I knew that the money that Diaz Lanz received to make the payment for the repairs of the B-25 came from CIA.

Olsen: Now did he tell you it came from CIA?

STURGIS: Certainly.

Olsen: Was there a time when the Bay of Pigs operation was being planned?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

Olsen: Was it intended that your aircraft were going to be used in connection with that operation?

STURGIS: Yes sir. The same thing with the boat, the money that came to maintain the boat for the operation of CIA.

Olsen: Who told you this?

STURGIS: Pedro Diaz Lanz.

Olsen: So that both with respect to the maintenance of your boats and maintenance of the aircraft, Pedro told you that the money was provided for taking care of that was provided him in turn by the CIA?

STURGIS: Yes. He told me that the boats, or the airplanes, needed repairs. And I told him to go see BARKER and get the money. And that is exactly what he did, he went to see BARKER.

Olsen: Did you ever discuss that with BARKER?

STURGIS: I am not sure, really. Again, I am going back into something as detail, whether I told him hey, there was money needed for repairs of the plane, get the money or not, I just told Diaz Lanz to go see BARKER, and to get the boat - get the airplane operational, and that he would give me the money. And that he would get the money. And he did get the money.

Olsen: That is the kind of information that I have been seeking. I am trying to pin down what the money was for, who told you it was CIA money, and what steps were taken that led to your getting the money. Were there any other operations or expenditures that you had which you feel you are on strong, sound ground in saying were financed by the CIA?

STURGIS: I was asked to do an assassination.

Olsen: By whom?

STURGIS: Can I hold back on that?

Olsen: No, I would prefer that you tell us, if you will.

STURGIS: It was never carried out.

Olsen: That is all right.

STURGIS: I was contacted by this agent -- I am trying to go ahead and think of the date again, because again I will say, I had notes, and I keep them so far, and then I destroy them. And I did tell the Senate Watergate Committee that a friend of mine who was a CIA agent contacted me and asked me if I would do an assassination. And I told him I would. He said, good. Then, I will pass it on to my superior. And he made contact with me later, at a later date. I believe we had -- I am not sure -- I think we had either lunch or dinner at some ranch house.

Olsen: Is this in Miami?

STURGIS: Yes.

Olsen: First of all, can you go back and tell me when you were approached by this friend of yours.

STURGIS: This is why I say, I can't remember by the exact date, and maybe by talking --

Olsen: How about, if you give us the season of what year?

Roethe: How about just the year?

STURGIS: I can't remember the year.

Roethe: This is after you got back from Cuba, obviously?

STURGIS: Yes, it had to be. Let me see if I can narrow it down just about what year. Let's see. It had to be either before the Bay of Pigs, which is 1961, or after the Bay of Pigs, which again could be 1961. So I would say approximately it would be 1961.

Olsen: Then where were you approached?

STURGIS: In Miami.

Olsen: And is this somebody, FRANK, for the moment, let's defer to your wishes, or your reservations, at least, by naming them. But is this somebody whom you knew to be employed by the CIA?

STURGIS: No, sir.

Olsen: Is it somebody who you knew to be a contract agent of the CIA?

STURGIS: No sir. All I knew is that he was an agent, and at a later date, it was proven he was an agent. So my contacts with this man throughout the years, how he worked, my close contact with him, in Miami, the way of operation, the way he handles himself, the people that he was in close contact with, that the top political and military people who were in exile that he was in touch with, the formation of the Bay of Pigs itself before the invasion, came through this particular man. He was part of the forming of this -- at least of the Revolutionary Council. And I was approached by him and I told Sam about it. I said, Sam, what do you think? The idiot -- I hope this never gets publicized.

Olsen: Trust us.

STURGIS: I said, this idiot took me out, and we had some lunch, and he asked me if I wanted to do an assassination, or if I would do an assassination attempt for the outfit. And I looked him square in the face and I told him why did you come to me? And he says, well, FRANK, like, who else? You are a man that the Chief knows your background, and I know your background, and I know you are capable. And you are a capable man. And if anybody can do it, you can do it. But the thing is, would you be interested? And I said, yes I would be.

Olsen: Did he talk to you about a sum of money?

STURGIS: No, no money was -- the discussion of money was not involved in it, because I would not do anything for money. And he knows better than to ask me, unless it would be, FRANK, what do you need for your expenses?

Olsen: Who was the target of this assassination? Was it Fidel?

STURGIS: No. I don't know. What happened was that I had another meeting with him, and he said he would contact his Chief, and he would -- and he told me to contact him later on, and I think he gave me a certain day to contact him, and I said okay. You must remember that, how I know this man as an agent, because he does the same things as I do, in his wife, he types away, or at least he has a wife who types away, he makes all the reports, and stacks them in a file cabinet. I have heard him talk to his Case Officer on the telephone. And to me that was very stupid of him in doing that event to me who was his friend. That is a very stupid way of doing things. Because he did not suspect that I was in contact with Sam, he cannot know. And the only time he suspected that I had anything to do with the CIA is when we were in prison, and the man on the television said, yes, he used to work for the CIA.

Olsen: When you say CIA, you were talking about the Watergate, not the other agent and me?

STURGIS: I am talking about the agent and me, who was part of the Watergate group. And he was dumbfounded and said, what, you work for CIA? And I said, yes sir, you dumb bastard you, I was turning you in to my case officer.

Olsen: So neither one of you suspected --

STURGIS: I knew he was an agent, but I didn't know that I was in contact -- I never used the word -- or at least I don't think I did, and I hope I haven't used it today -- that I said I was an employee of CIA.

Olsen: No, I haven't even said that you were an agent of the CIA.

STURGIS: Or that I was connected with the CIA.

Olsen: Now, who was the target of this conversation about assassination?

STURGIS: I had a second meeting with him at the Ranch House and he told me, he says, well, this is interesting FRANK. He said, about his assassination, and I said, fine. I did. And then he started to questioning, how would you do it? And I said, how do you mean how I would do it? There are several ways of trying to do an assassination. The things I have to know is who the person is, that is number 1, it is important, and where the person is at, which is important. And then, I will have to go ahead and go to the place where this man lives or what have you, after I know this information. And I said then, I can go ahead and tell you how I can do it. And he said, with a body, this and that, he will be discovered, you know we can't be connected with it. And I said, well, if you are worried about that, you do it. And he said, well, I can't do it. And I said, Okay, beautiful. And I want -- I wanted to tell you something, I will do this, because you are a friend of mine, and because you asked me. But I will want more than that. And he said what is that? I said I want it from somebody higher than you, from somebody with authority. If you tell me -- and you are my friend, and I believe you -- but I want it more from somebody that has some authority. You have a case officer. I want your case officer to tell me to do an assassination plot, and I will do it. But coming from you, you are my friend, my buddy, but I have got to have more than that for my protection.

Olsen: Did he ever put you in contact with his case officer?

STURGIS: I knew who his boss was.

Olsen: Who was his boss?

STURGIS: EDUARDO. Wait a minute. I am sorry. I could be wrong there. I said the wrong thing. If I am going after the Bay of Pigs invasion, if this did happen, as far as the date is concerned, after the Bay of Pigs invasion, EDUARDO did quit the operation and go on some other assignment or what have you. So that means he was no longer in the Miami area. So this part I had to get a new case officer.

Olsen: EDUARDO left Miami before the Bay of Pigs, didn't he?

STURGIS: He left after -- well, I don't know, I am sorry. Because there is the possibility that he may have been either in Miami or he may have been in the Headquarters in Washington. But I can't pin it down because I don't know exactly where he was at.

Olsen: Did he ever make contacts with the man's case officer?

STURGIS: No, sir, because it had to be one of two people, it either had to be EDUARDO, whom I had never met, or it had to be possibly (Deleted) [Esterline], after EDUARDO left.

Olsen: Did (Deleted) take his place then.

STURGIS: I believed so, I believe (Deleted) did take his place as this party's case officer.

Olsen: And then, you did not actually have any contact with his case officer?

STURGIS: When I told him that, I think it kind of stung him a little bit. And he said, well, okay, all right. Then, you will go through with it? And I said certainly I will go through with it, I don't care who the hell it is. I said, you let me know. And hopefully, I was thinking of Fidel Castro, because I could have snuck in to Cuba, I have done it so many times, and I would have taken a crack at killing Fidel.

Roethe: I missed something when I was out of the room. I take it you did not know the identity of the person whom you were being asked to assassinate?

STURGIS: No, sir, I did not. I asked him -- you see, I didn't publish it, in other words, I was told no publicity. I was told, because Sam says go ahead and work with him and he said let me know what is progressing.

Roethe: Is Sam what you would call your case officer?

STURGIS: Sam is my contact, the one I was connected with.

Roethe: And you would always go to him before you would go ahead with some action like this?

STURGIS: Oh, exactly. I wouldn't do anything unless I received an okay from somebody.

Roethe: Did you have any idea that this had anything to do with Cuba?

STURGIS: It always had to do with Cuba.

Roethe: You were aware that this assassination had something to do with Cuba?

STURGIS: I was thinking that if it did, I could have been wrong. I was thinking it could have something to do with Cuba.

Roethe: Did Sam seem to know anything about the subject -- about this, or did this seem to come as a surprise?

STURGIS: It was a surprise. He was surprised that my friend approached me on something like this. And he said, don't say no. I said I will do it to anybody. I said Sam, if it is all right, if this case officer -- Sam said, tell me who the case officer is, and if it is true, okay.

Roethe: What was your motivation for saying that you would do this?

STURGIS: Do you know what a whore is?

Roethe: Do I know what a whore is?

STURGIS: Yes.

Roethe: I guess I do.

STURGIS: I don't mean to go ahead and embarrass you. I am sorry. But in intelligence a whore is an agent that they would want that would do anything. But he has got to be motivated by patriotism. And that he would do anything for his country, regardless of what it was.

Roethe: Assuming that it was something that an official request made on behalf of the government?

STURGIS: Well, you would think that if it was case officer -- and you would be surprised how powerful a case officer -- what power a case officer has in his hands. He has got a lot of power.

Olsen: Thank you very much, FRANK.

(Whereupon at 6:00 p.m. the interview was concluded).

In a telephone interview with Robert Olsen of the Rockefeller Commission on April 22, 1975 it was noted: "Wants to correct something. Park Wollan was Council General but STURGIS didn't contact him. It was Paterson, called him Bill. Was CIA Agent there, left CIA later after getting to be Chief of Station in Santiago. STURGIS was in touch with Wollan, possibly met him. (Deleted) and (Deleted) were in Havana."

STURGIS told Paul Meskil: "We met at the Casa Grande Hotel in Santiago. Wollan knew who I was and what I was doing. He approached me or someone introduced us. We had several other meetings and discussed my patriotism and so forth. I agreed to work with him. Later, when the revolution was over, I received orders to go to Havana. Wollan told me who to contact in the American Embassy there." STURGIS said his contact at the Embassy was Sam Kail.

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