THE WARREN REPORT V. POSNER

The Warren Report: "On the actual signed copy of the application kept in the files of the Moscow Embassy, which is not a carbon copy of the copy sent to the State Department, the strike out is slightly above the 'have;' therefore, since the 'have' is itself printed above the 'have not,' the strikeout may have been intended to obliterate the 'have.'"

Posner: "On the original, the strikeout is between the have and have not, and only on the carbon is it directly over the have not."

This is Warren Commission Exhibit CE 947.

ANALYSIS

OSWALD believed he went to Russia on a mission approved by the CIA and committed "treason" at the behest of that Agency. OSWALD believed he, in one sense, had committed treason, but in another sense he had performed a patriotic act on behalf of his country. OSWALD had expressed fear that he would be prosecuted in the United States for acts connected with his defection. The section that OSWALD had in mind dealt with treason, not his declaration of allegiance to the Soviet Union: OSWALD knew that he had never formally renounced his American citizenship in front of a State Department Consular official nor had he filled out the State Department's official form which was required in these cases, so that he could not be disqualified from renewing his passport because of having made "a formal renunciation of nationality, either in the United States or before or before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state." Snyder thought OSWALD'S having told him he had committed an act which would disqualify him from renewing his passport had to do with OSWALD'S informal pledge of loyalty to the Soviet Union - a statement that clearly fell within the bounds of free speech. Snyder knew that OSWALD never returned to the Embassy to sign the formal renunciation papers. He knew that OSWALD knew this too. Then why didn't Snyder make it a point to ask OSWALD which act OSWALD believed he had committed so he could make a notation of it on the form?

By the time OSWALD filled out the questionnaire he realized if he wished to return to the United States he would have to explain to Snyder about his CIA connections or he would have to commit perjury. His response to this question changed. This should have further alerted Snyder.

As to where the XXX's were on the original form versus the carbon - this was irrelevant because Snyder was typing up the form as he was asking OSWALD the various questions. It was not OSWALD who typed the form. And Snyder heard OSWALD say "have" and Snyder typed it in and then Snyder asked OSWALD to fill out a supplementary questionnaire, because he heard the word "have" and remembered it no matter where the XXX's were on the application.

Richard E. Snyder commented, "Defection is really a loaded word. Any American citizen can leave his country for any other country. You do not need anyone's permission. There's no crime committed there. I presume he just didn't know. He may have had reason in his own mind to be worried about the statement that he would make available to the Soviets what he learned of radar. That I could imagine. It may have disturbed him that he didn't know what the law was and he might have imagined that he would be held for it." It was suggested to Richard E. Snyder that the only way he would be worried was if, in fact, he had given the Soviets secret information. He commented: "Yes, but I have no idea what the law is on that."

EVIDENCE: OSWALD'S RUSSIAN DICTIONARY

The Miami Herald reported: "The only possession of LEE HARVEY OSWALD not confiscated by government agents at the John F. Kennedy assassination was an English, Russian dictionary in which numerous words were marked or copied including a phrase meaning "to hit or kill at a distance." It hasn't been checked out for microdots, or anything," said former sheriff's chief Deputy John Cullins. He was given the book by OSWALD'S widow, Marina Porter. Marina confirmed the dictionary belonged to her late husband and that the handwriting and markings in the book were his. She said she could not understand why government agents did not notice it when they descended upon the couples residence after the assassination. She said she did not look in the book or notice the emphasized or hand-written practice words until Cullins asked her to translate them. Among the emphasized words were "radar" and "range" "eject" and "razor." "Radar locator" is written in OSWALD'S handwriting and a definition of "range" is underlined before being rewritten in Russian. The Russian phrase, Marina said, means: "To beat, hit kill at a definite distance." Another translation means to kill or slaughter, like an animal. Cullins said, "I think it was a resume or information on his part that he was preparing to give up to someone who spoke or read Russian. I see no other reason he would look things up in English and practice them in Russian." [Miami Herald 8.9.81] Marina Oswald told this researcher in 1994: "I gave the dictionary to John Cullins who tried to make money off the whole thing. This was the only time he was friend."

EVIDENCE: OSWALD'S CRYPTIC NOTE

During OSWALD'S voyage to the United States in 1962, he made the following notation: "as for the fee of $_________I was supposed to recive for this________I refuse it. I made pretense to except it only because otherwise I would have been considered a crack pot and not allowed to appear to express my views. after all who would refuse money?!?"

ANALYSIS

OSWALD deliberately left the blank spaces, indicated by pen strokes. The first blank was difficult to fill in. How much money OSWALD received was a mystery; however, the dollar sign indicated the payment had not been made in rubles. Since OSWALD'S Red Cross subsidy was paid to him in rubles, this paragraph referred to another payment. OSWALD: "Whene I first went to Russia I the winter of 1959 my funds were very limited, so after a certain time, after the Russians had assured themselfs that I was really the naive american who beliyved in communism, they arranged for me to recive a certain amount of money every month. OK it came technically through the Red Cross as finical help to a Roos polical immigrate but it was arranged by the M.V.D.. I told myself it was simply because I was broke and everybody knew it. I accepted the money because I was hungry and there were several inches of snow on the ground in Moscow at the time but what it really was payment for my denuciation of the U.S. in Moscow in November 1956 and a clear promise that for as long as I lived in the USSR life would be very good I didn't relize all this, of course, for almost two years." [WCE 25]

The second blank made sense when the word "information" was placed in it. [WCE 25 p2B p122 of Vol.] Note that when Yuri Nosenko first approached the American Embassy, Geneva, he offered to sell information to the CIA for 900 Swiss francs. Later he admitted inventing this story; "He said he feared that an offer to give away information would be rejected as a provocation..." [Wise, Molehunt p68] Marina Oswald told this interviewer: "Maybe he make blank line because he forget amount."

KOZLOVA

Another financial link centered on the name Kozlova found in his address book:

Vneshtory Bank

Bank of Foreign Trade

Moscow

Neglinnaya Ul. 12

Kozlova (woman's surname)

K-03400 (telephone number)

(792) (possible telephone extension)

The CIA: "

TO: Files

FROM: M.D. Stevens

3. Security Indices contain information on a number of women with the name Kozlova, none of whom can be identified as being the individual in question; but any of whom might be.

(1) Olympiada Kozlova, #MS-16332, is the aunt of Nikolai Vasilievich Kozlov (deleted) CI/SIG has information on Kozlov which makes reference to various female relatives of his by the name of Kozlova. Olympiada Kozlova, a professor, is the Director of the Moscow Institute of Engineering and Economics. She is active politically, often travels abroad, and in November 1961, was scheduled to travel to Washington, D.C., with a scientific group. It should be possible to obtain this woman's telephone number for comparison with that listed in OSWALD'S address book under the name Kozlova.

(2) One 'Valentina Kozlova, NSC,' was observed to arrive at the Soviet Mission in Tokyo on June 11, 1956, at 10:45 a.m. and to depart at 12:07 p.m. She was not further identified in our information.

(3) One Lyubov Nikolaevna Kozlova, (deleted) [spacing for 201 number] was an interpreter in the USSR Embassy in London from 1950 to 1953, and in the U.N. in New York City in 1954." [CIA 487, 470, 1299-470].

The 1962 Moscow Telephone Directory lists the telephone number K-03400 for the Ministry of Finance of the USSR located at Neglinnaya Ul. 12. (The number next to it was an extension or room number at the Ministry). The same source also gives the address of the Vneshtorg Bank as Neglinnaya Ul. 12.

EVIDENCE: POWERS BELIEVED OSWALD WAS RESPONSIBLE

In 1970 Francis Gary Powers wrote in Overflight that he believed OSWALD'S defection was related to his being shot down: "OSWALD'S familiarity with MPS 16 height-finding radar gear and radio codes (the latter were changed following his defection) are mentioned in the testimony of John E. Donovan a former first lieutenant assigned to the same El Toro radar unit as OSWALD on page 298 of Volume 8 of the Warren Commission Hearings. According to Donovan: "OSWALD has access to the location of all bases in the west coast area, all radio frequencies for all squadrons, all tactical call signs, and the relative strength of all squadrons, number and type of aircraft in each squadron, who was the commanding officer, the authentification code of entering and exiting the ADIZ, which stands for Air Defense Identification Zone. He knew the range of our radar. He knew the range of our radio. And he knew the range of the surrounding unit's radio and radar. OSWALD'S conversation with Snyder is mentioned at least three times in the Warren Report: "OSWALD told [Snyder] that he had already offered a Soviet official what he had learned as a radar operator in the Marines." [Overflight pg. 358] The FBI reported: "News media report Powers has theorized LEE HARVEY OSWALD gave the Soviets radar secrets and information as to U-2's altitude capacity."

EVIDENCE: VLADIMIR SEMICHASTNY

Vladimir Semichastny told Frontline: "There were conversations, but this was such outdated information, the kind we say the sparrows have already chirped to the entire world, and now OSWALD tells us about it. Not the kind of information that would interest such a high level organization such as ours." Scott Malone confirmed that this information dealt with the U-2, but that OSWALD supplied it after the U-2 had been shot down. Vladimir Semichastny: "We already had better sources of information. We had the plane and the pilot." [Interview with W.S. Malone]

THE RELEASE OF FRANCIS GARY POWERS

Francis Gary Powers was given a ten-year prison sentence by the Soviets. The name of the prosecutor at Powers' trial was Roman Andreyevich Rudenko. The name Aleksandr Rudenchek was found in OSWALD'S address book with the notation, teacher, next to it. Francis Gary Powers could have received the death penalty. He was well treated in prison. Eventually, former OSS General Counsel James B. Donovan (died January 20, 1970) ,who had defended GRU Colonel Rudolph Abel, arranged for Francis Gary Powers to be exchanged for Rudolph Abel. Rudolf Abel had been an illegal agent stationed in the United States. ANGLETON had helped develop the trail that led to Rudolf Abel. This was a poor trade for America - a master spy exchanged for a mere CIA contractual employee.

United States Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy opposed the trade. He anticipated that when Francis Gary Powers returned to the United States he would be tried for treason. Francis Gary Powers' behavior in the Soviet Union became the focus of much criticism. The CIA set up a board of inquiry headed by retired Federal Appeals Court Judge E. Barrett Prettyman. In the Summer of 1962 James B. Donovan and E. Barrett Prettyman negotiated with the Castro Government for the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners. Hearings were held in CIA Headquarters, and Francis Gary Powers was cleared of any wrongdoing. The only "evidence received by the Board which directly conflicted with Powers' account was part of a report based on (deleted). Some of these (deleted) indicated that the Soviets thought the flight of the U-2 had continued at the same altitude beyond the point where Francis Gary Powers claimed it fell, that it then descended to a lower altitude, and then it charged its course by turning in a broad circle back to the neighborhood of Sverdlovsk and disappeared from the observation of the trackers sine 35 minutes later. The activities which culminate in a (deleted). In the course of the presentation of the evidence to the Board the obvious possibility of confusion and error was pointed out; indeed at least one dramatic incident of error due to confusion was explained to the Board in detail. Of course this operation of the American intelligence system is invaluable. But the Board is of the opinion that it cannot make a flat assumption of accuracy in these (Deleted) so as to invalidate all other evidence concerning the occurrence of the incident. It is the conclusion of the Board that the evidence establishes overwhelmingly that Power's account was a truthful account." Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles, personally congratulated Francis Gary Powers. Francis Gary Powers divorced his wife, who had once been the Subject of a complaint by Richard Bissell, and he married a CIA psychologist. He was hired as a test pilot for Lockheed Aviation, which produced the U-2. In June 1977 an attempt was made by this researcher to locate Francis Gary Powers.

THE DEATH OF FRANCIS GARY POWERS

On August 1, 1977, Francis Gary Powers was killed when the traffic helicopter he was flying for a Los Angeles radio station ran out of fuel. The New York Times reported: "The 47 year old aviator, who had survived the downing of his U-2 over the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk on May 1, 1960, died when he Bell Jet Ranger helicopter crashed near a Little League baseball field in the San Fernando Valley suburb of Encino. George Spears, a cameraman for the television station KNBC, also died. The initial indications were that the helicopter had run out of fuel. James Turner, an official of the Federal Aviation Administration control tower at Van Nuys had received a message from an unidentified helicopter pilot at 12:36. The pilot said he was low on fuel and was granted approval for an expedited, direct approach to the airport. Francis Gary Powers crashed at 12:38 p.m. An official of KNBC checked in by radio with his supervisors at the station at about 12:25 p.m. said he was returning to Van Nys for fuel and asked what his next assignment would be. He was told he would probably be assigned to cover another brush fire near Los Angeles this afternoon. Station officials said he mentioned nothing about being short of fuel. One witness told a fireman that the tail rotor of the helicopter fell off before the crash, but this was not immediately confirmed." Powers had worked for KNBC for nine months. The National Transportation Safety Board investigated the crash, and determined that it was a case of too long a flight with too little fuel, because it found the tank and fuel lines totally empty. The National Transportation Safety Board never examined the instruments (which were largely intact) to determine whether the readings they registered to Francis Gary Powers were accurate. [NTSB Powers Rep.; NYT 8.2.77; Ross & Wise Inv. Gov. p226]

ANALYSIS

There was something suspicious about the death of Francis Gary Powers. For someone who criss-crossed the Soviet Union numerous times to die in a helicopter crash of this nature strains my credulity.

YURI NOSENKO, OSWALD AND THE U-2

In 1964 Yuri Nosenko was asked: "Wouldn't you have connected OSWALD'S coming from Finland with Anatoliy Golitsyn?"

A. No, no. It is not unusual.

Q. Why didn't the KGB fully debrief OSWALD on the U.S. Marine Corps, and particularly such things as American radar installations in Japan?

A. I think they didn't even know that he had been in Japan.

Q. Why didn't they find out? Ask him?

A. Nobody will go to speak to a person who is not normal. The KGB is frightened.

Q. What do you mean, frightened? That is the job of the KGB.

A. I don't mean frightened that way. The KGB is frightened because to talk to somebody like this, to get involved with him, will result in a big headache

Q. Didn't anybody ever sit down with this man and get his full biographic data? Ask him to write his life history, every place he ever lived, worked, everything he has done. If he was in the military service, when, what, where, everything?

A. Never. Nobody did.

Q. I can't believe it...This man could have spent five years of his life working for American intelligence. Maybe all the time he was in the Marines he was working with intelligence. And the KGB wouldn't know about it?

A. It wasn't done. He was never spoken to by any KGB officer in Moscow or Minsk.

The HSCA asked Yuri Nosenko: "Would the Soviet Union be interested in someone who was in the military and worked with radar equipment?"

A. It depends. If he was a corporal, private, no big interest. If he was an officer maybe they be interested.

Q. The fact that he worked with the equipment wouldn't be enough; they would want to know what his rank was?

A. No sir, it is not enough because they had sources.

Q. And in 1959 would the Soviet Union have been interested in someone who served as a radar operator on an air base where the U-2's took off and landed?

A. Yes, sir, it would be very interested.

Q. Is it your testimony that LEE HARVEY OSWALD, who had been a radar operator, and had worked on base from where the U-2 took off and landed, that he wasn't even interesting enough for the KGB to speak to him, to find out if he knew any of this information?

A. Mr. Klein, I understand your position, but we didn't know he had any connection with the U-2 flights. That is one thing.

The HSCA questioned Soviet Russia Division Chief, David Murphy, about Yuri Nosenko: "I did not believe that it would be possible for the Soviet Intelligence Services to have remained indifferent to the arrival in 1959 in Moscow of a former Marine radar operator who had served at what was an active U-2 operational base. I found that to be strange." Defector Peter Deryabin opined: "It is evident in the supplementary materials that even in his early meetings with U.S. Embassy personnel, OSWALD was ready to give any information on the Marines, etc. (including some 'special' type of information) to the Soviets; then why does the [CIA's] chronology apparently try to whitewash OSWALD by saying: 'When asked about his statement on October 1959 to the effect that he would willingly make available to the USSR that he had acquired as a radar operator for the Marine Corps, OSWALD replied that he had never been questioned and doubted he would have given such information if asked...It is the opinion of the undersigned that this whole paper was written in OSWALD'S defense."

THE NOSENKO INCUBUS

One of the most puzzling mysteries surrounding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy revolved around the question of Yuri Nosenko's defection and bona fides. A CIA Staff member commented: "Once Nosenko is exposed as a KGB plant there will arise the danger that his information will be mirror read." Edward Petty: "The only time OSWALD became of really serious interest to CI/SIG was after the assassination. Nosenko came over claiming that he had seen the KGB's OSWALD file. He came over at precisely the right time, he defected within about 60 days of the Kennedy assassination. And so here you have a really fascinating coincidence; a KGBnik coming in with precisely the information needed about OSWALD at that particular time." Yuri Nosenko claimed OSWALD had no connection or contact with the KGB. Had Nosenko been dispatched by Moscow to cover up OSWALD'S contact with the KGB during the U-2 dump? Or was he bona fide and telling what he knew about OSWALD? Was he bona fide and lying about OSWALD? Or, as Edward Petty suggested, was he exposed to limited information on OSWALD then spooked into defecting?

GENEVA

Yuri Nosenko was born in the USSR in 1927, to Bolshevik parents. His father would become Nikita Khrushchev's Minister of Shipbuilding. Yuri Nosenko was a dedicated Communist. At age 18 he entered the International Relations Institute in Moscow. Upon graduation in 1951, he claimed he joined Soviet Naval Intelligence. By 1953 he was a KGB agent.

On June 5, 1962, while serving as a KGB Security Officer in Geneva, Yuri Nosenko approached the CIA for money and agreed to act as an agent-in-place. The CIA: "A current review of [Nosenko's] statements and remarks during his five contacts in 1962 indicate that his many errors, exaggerations, and actual lies were quite likely typical of a braggadocio element in the personality of Nosenko...Nosenko, during his five contacts in Geneva, made many statements which, in retrospect, were impossible and the investigation of which could only have raised certain questions concerning Nosenko:

(A) Nosenko claimed he personally was with Oleg M. Gribanov, Chief of SCD, during the recruitment pitch to (deleted). This was a lie and an interview with (deleted) with display of photograph would have disclosed that Nosenko did not participate.

(B) Nosenko was involved in the recruitment approach to Russell Langelle. This was a lie and Langelle was available for interview.

© Nosenko said he recruited (deleted) in Bulgaria. Actually Nosenko never met (deleted)."

NOSENKO VERSUS GOLITSYN

The CIA went on to list four other examples of Nosenko's lies, then stated: "In 1962 to 1963 a number of similarities were noted between information furnished by Nosenko and information which had been furnished by Anatoliy Golitsyn prior to June 1962. These similarities were quite striking and gave rise to certain suspicions of Nosenko because he provided information which the KGB already considered compromised as a result of the defection of Anatoliy Golitsyn. Certain of the similarities at the time could only be explained in terms of Nosenko being a dispatched agent. (A) Both furnished information in regard to (deleted)." The CIA supplied four more examples of KGB operations compromised by Anatoliy Golitsyn and mentioned by Nosenko. One of these dealt with the audio operations against the American Embassy. Anatoliy Golitsyn had previously supplied the CIA with this information.

Certain information supplied by Yuri Nosenko conflicted with information supplied by Anatoliy Golitsyn. For example, Anatoliy Golitsyn mentioned the attempted recruitment of an American Embassy, Moscow, code clerk during a train ride to Helsinki: "Yuri Nosenko, as Deputy Chief of the First Section specifically charged with work against code clerks, should have been aware of the November 1960 trip of Kosolapov to and from Helsinki. His lack of knowledge may or may not be explainable in terms of his other activities such as his trip to Cuba in November to December 1960."

Yuri Nosenko returned to the USSR, but being in the Second Chief Directorate, he said he knew the degree of coverage there was in Moscow and refused to have contact with the CIA there. He was sent back to Geneva in January 1964 for another disarmament conference. There, he told the CIA he wanted to defect to the West because he had received a recall telegram from Moscow. He later retracted this, and said that he invented it, because he was afraid the CIA would not let him defect. [Nosenko interview with Posner] Edward Petty: "I think Bagley got him to admit that he never got such a telegram."

YURI NOSENKO'S 1964 OSWALD STORY

Yuri Nosenko told the CIA he had helped manage the 1959 OSWALD defection case, when he was Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department and that OSWALD'S visa application in Helsinki was handled by Pereletov who had been in "the KGB's 2nd Department in Leningrad, and there he was dealing with tourists." Yuri Nosenko then stated: "KGB had no interest in OSWALD...OSWALD was regarded as mentally unstable." This was based on a report furnished to him and his associate Krupnov (Kim Georgiyevich) by Rimma Sherakova "who was an agent or operational contact of his." Yuri Nosenko mentioned Chelnokov, Gribanov, Bobkov, Sergey Mikhaylovich and Konstantin Nikitovich in connection with the OSWALD case. Yuri Nosenko: "There was no personal interview of OSWALD by KGB and no further attempt to establish his bona fides...No consideration was given to his possible KGB operational potential...There was, of course, the consideration that OSWALD might be an American Intelligence Agent, but no unusual measures were taken to investigate this possibility...without referral to higher authority, I decreed OSWALD should not be allowed to stay in Soviet Union." Yuri Nosenko implied that the request was not referred to the "CPSU or to any other Soviet Government agency." Yuri Nosenko stated that OSWALD had been advised at 9:00 a.m. on the morning of his suicide attempt that he would have to leave Russia: "Then he slashes his wrist at 10:00 a.m. The people at the hotel broke down the door to OSWALD'S hotel room and found him bleeding to death. And it is decided this kind of man would not be used by American intelligence. The KGB washed its hands of him...The KGB didn't want him in the Soviet Union and considered OSWALD as being not completely normal and not really very intelligent...After the suicide attempt, there was no attempt to debrief OSWALD because he was not an interesting person and was not normal...he was such a low level person that it was not thought that he would have information of value.

"Then the Soviet authorities decided to allow him to stay. The KGB had no choice. They must look on him. We didn't ask the 1st Department or the FCD because he is not an interesting person and is not normal. There were no microphones in any of OSWALD'S hotel rooms. It was not felt that he was of sufficient importance to justify the use of such techniques against him...We were getting no information. There were no such reports in the file...there was no record in the file that OSWALD had ever offered to give information on the U.S. Marine Corps or any matters to the Soviets...There was no physical or technical surveillance of OSWALD while he lived in Minsk. The OSWALD'S mail was monitored, but revealed nothing of interest." After the assassination, Yuri Nosenko, still in Moscow, was read a summary of OSWALD'S KGB file that concluded with the statement that in Minsk the KGB had attempted "to influence OSWALD in the right direction." Yuri Nosenko had also been present when OSWALD'S September 1963 request for a visa to the Soviet Union was denied, along with Turalin, Alekseyev, Chelnokov and Kovalenko. After the assassination, all KGB files from Minsk about OSWALD were flown to Moscow where it was discovered by Yuri Nosenko that the Minsk KGB had not taken any action with respect to OSWALD contrary to instructions from headquarters. Yuri Nosenko claimed repeatedly that the KGB had no contact with OSWALD whatsoever. OSWALD was never questioned about his past nor asked to write an autobiography.

THE CASE FOR YURI NOSENKO BEING DISPATCHED

TENNENT BAGLEY

In the U.S., Yuri Nosenko was handled by Tennent Harrington Bagley who discovered lies in Yuri Nosenko's story. Tennent Bagley was born in Annapolis, Maryland, on November 11, 1925, and came from a prominent Navy family. He served in World War II for three years in the U.S. Marine Corps then attended the University of Geneva, Switzerland, where he received a doctorate in political science. He served in the CIA from 1950 on, where he specialized in Soviet operations. After serving as a Case Officer in Austria, he was assigned to Switzerland in 1960. He'd known ANGLETON since 1961. From 1960 to 1962 Tennent Bagley was Deputy Chief, Soviet Russia, Clandestine Activities Section. Tennent Bagley, 37, held this position at the time of Yuri Nosenko's first Agency-contact in Geneva in 1962. In 1962 he became head of a section responsible for counter-intelligence against the Soviet intelligence services. In 1965 or 1966, he became Deputy Chief, Soviet Russia Division. He went to Europe as Brussels Chief of Station in 1967, and retired there in 1972. The HSCA called him as a witness. Tennent Bagley was convinced Yuri Nosenko was bogus for the following reasons:

(1) The CIA was unbelievably lucky to have found him. Tennent Bagley added, "the key word in that last sentence is 'unbelievably.'"

(2) There were contradictions in Yuri Nosenko's testimony that could not be explained by Yuri Nosenko's personality flaws or memory. According to Tennent Bagley, when he reviewed OSWALD'S KGB file, "Nosenko was already a willing secret collaborator of the CIA. Therefore he must have been alert when dealing with this matter of such obvious importance to the United States and to his own country...Nosenko told us some of these events only 10 weeks after they happened, so there wasn't time for them to become dim in his memory."

(3) "Ten years removed from this case I can still remember at least 20 clear cases of Nosenko's lying about KGB activity and about the career which gave him authority to tell of it..."

(4) The cases Nosenko revealed for the first time were useless.

(5) Tennent Bagley believed that the KGB had interviewed OSWALD: "Here was a young American, LEE HARVEY OSWALD, just out of the Marine Corps, already inside the USSR and going to great lengths to stay there and become a citizen. The KGB never bothered to talk to him, not even once, not even to get an idea whether he might be a CIA plant. Can this be true? Could we all be wrong in what we've heard about rigid Soviet security precautions and about their strict procedures and disciplines...? Of course not."

(6) Yuri Nosenko gave the CIA the location of several microphones in the American Embassy, Moscow. Tennent Bagley stated Anatoliy Golitsyn had given CIA the same information six months previous. Yuri Nosenko produced a list of microphones in the American Embassy, Moscow, from 1960 to 1961. He said, at great risk, he kept this document in a KGB safe he shared with two subordinates. Yuri Nosenko never plausibly explained the circumstances which prompted his retention of this list until 1964, when he produced it for the CIA in Geneva.

Anatoliy Golitsyn had provided, in the first months after his defection, information that led to: "the final uncovering of Kim Philby; to the first detection of several important penetrations of European governments; and pointers to serious penetrations of the United States Government." Tennent Bagley stated that Yuri Nosenko's information had all been previously compromised, citing the case of William John Vassall, an exposed KGB agent in the British Admiralty. Yuri Nosenko: "The KGB has now (1962) an agent in a high government position in London who provides most valuable information, some from NATO intelligence service conferences. The agent was recruited in Moscow in 1956 or 1957 on the basis of a homosexual compromise. After leaving Moscow he became an assistant to the Minister, or something like that, in the Admiralty. Yuri Nosenko learned of the agent's existence, not his identity. Anatoliy Golitsyn had earlier provided a lead to a KGB agent who was the source of Admiralty documents which Anatoliy Golitsyn had reviewed in KGB Headquarters. On the basis of that lead, British security authorities on June 11, 1962, passed to CIA a list of 20 suspects, including William John Vassall."

The Chief of Soviet Research, Counter-Intelligence, commented: "Yuri Nosenko is a KGB plant and may be publicly exposed as such sometime. The Agency's greatest contribution to the resolution of the questions at hand would be to break Yuri Nosenko and get the full story of how and why he was told to tell the story he did about OSWALD." [CIA FOIA 02911 7.28.64]

Tennent Bagley described himself as the principal opponent of Yuri Nosenko. The CIA produced "some penciled jotting...left carelessly in a highly secret file folder" in Tennent Bagley's handwriting which suggested "liquidation, drugging, or confinement in mental institutions" as means of breaking Yuri Nosenko. Tennent Bagley: "The fact that 'liquidation' was included revealed that they [the notes] were theoretical."

In a lengthy, top secret report released in 1994, [CIA TS No. 197124] Tennent Bagley stated: "Yuri Nosenko did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed. Yuri Nosenko did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time he claimed. Yuri Nosenko did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the 1953 to 1955 period as he claimed. During the period 1955 to 1960 he was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department, American/British Commonwealth Section. Yuri Nosenko was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section, nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section during the period 1961 to 1962. The contradictions in Yuri Nosenko's accounts of his life and KGB service are so extensive as to make his claims as a whole unacceptable. Given the conclusion that Nosenko is not a bona fide defector, it is necessary to attempt to determine his true motives for contacting American Intelligence and for providing the information he has given..." Reasonable explanations advanced for Nosenko's misrepresentations ranged from "swindler posing as former KGB agent" to "mental case" to "dispatched KGB agent." Tennent Bagley: "Nosenko is a KGB officer who served in at least some of the components for some or all of the time periods that he claims, but who greatly exaggerated his positions, rank and access to information, to achieve greater status with American Intelligence. Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that Nosenko was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all these anomalies, none of them renders it untenable."

ANGLETON

ANGLETON believed Nosenko was dispatched. He knew Nosenko was lying about OSWALD'S KGB connection, because he had used OSWALD in the U-2 dump, and he knew the KGB officer with whom OSWALD had contact. ANGLETON stated: "This agency has no information that would corroborate or disprove Nosenko's statements regarding OSWALD." [CIA Memo: ANGLETON to Hoover 4.28.64]

Other CIA staffers, who were unaware of OSWALD'S connection to ANGLETON, concluded, for different reasons, that if Yuri Nosenko was dispatched, it must have been to accomplish or further a KGB purpose or mission, "the nature of which has been, and continues to be, unknown...The theory has also been considered that Nosenko could have been dispatched to confuse and divert American Intelligence and thus protect an important KGB penetration or penetrations of the United States Government, particularly the CIA. This is a theory which has been given full consideration, but it is not possible to factually substantiate or refute this theory in the absence of specific information that high-level KGB penetrations do, or do not, exist."

PRIMARY FACTORS INDICATING NOSKENO DISPATCHED

Yuri Nosenko was a liar. Yuri Nosenko admitted lying about needing money and about the recall cable. Yuri Nosenko claimed he was a KGB Lieutenant Colonel. The CIA could not verify this. In 1992 Yuri Nosenko told Gerald Posner that "his appointment was still in the process of being approved, yet his travel document did say he was a lieutenant colonel." [Case Closed, p39]

Oleg Nechiporenko named different people than Yuri Nosenko in relation to OSWALD in 1959: Aleksandr Perepelitsyn, V. Vysotin. He also said different people handled OSWALD'S September 1963, visa request: Dryakhlov, Vlasov, Bannikov. Yuri Nosenko said OSWALD had no KGB contact, Oleg Nechiporenko said he did. Nonetheless, Oleg Nechiporenko stated that Yuri Nosenko was genuine, and the KGB had sentenced him to death.

Yuri Nosenko had the time of OSWALD'S suicide wrong. Yuri Nosenko said OSWALD'S hotel room was not bugged. Not only was it bugged, there was a camera in it. Yuri Nosenko said there was no technical surveillance on OSWALD in Minsk. There was, as reported by his neighbor. In fact, a 1992 Izvestia article entitled, KGB File No. 31451, stated that OSWALD was under constant surveillance. The article went on to say that OSWALD was suspected of seeking out people with access to secret information, and so was put in touch with people who pretended to have this access. He was lured into anti-Soviet conversations. When he went hunting, KGB agents followed him. OSWALD was drugged and watched by 20 agents. Yet Gerald Posner wrote that this article "both supplements and confirms the information from Yuri Nosenko."

ADDITIONAL CONTRADICTIONS

Yuri Nosenko stated that although the KGB recognized that OSWALD may have been an American agent, no unusual measures were taken to check on this possibility, since it already had been decided not to let him stay in the USSR. Was the KGB only interested in spies who stayed in the USSR for more than a week? Yuri Nosenko said the KGB did not consider recruiting Marina Oswald to report on OSWALD "because she was his wife and it was considered dangerous to recruit a wife to report on her husband." The KGB would recruit children to spy on their parents.

Yuri Nosenko repeatedly referred to the KGB's recognition that OSWALD was not normal as the reason for the KGB's failure to take various steps which it could normally be expected to take against a foreigner like OSWALD. In other words, a lack of normality, and the KGB's recognition of it, provided the peg for the whole story of the KGB's handling of OSWALD. Yuri Nosenko stated Marina Oswald had no difficulty leaving the country, because she was married to an American. This reasoning seems to overlook the fact that OSWALD had already declared his intention (through mail to the U.S. Embassy) to leave the USSR before he married her. If this fact were known to the KGB, as presumably it was, Marina Oswald's marriage request would have been closely scrutinized. [CIA Memo Wigren to C/SR 7.8.64]

SAM JAFFE

Reporter Sam Jaffe was one of the American citizens wrongly exposed by Yuri Nosenko.

Samuel Adason Jaffe was born in San Francisco. He served in the Merchant Marine in World War II and then the Navy Reserves. He was a Marine combat correspondent in Korea during the war there. He attended the University of California at Berkeley, Columbia University, and the New School For Social Research. He worked for the old International News Service in San Francisco. He worked briefly for the U.N. in the early 1950's and then joined Life Magazine, where he was a reporter from 1952 to 1955. In 1955, as a freelancer, he covered a conference of Third World countries at Bandung, Indonesia, and interviewed the late Chou En-lai of China. As a correspondent for CBS from 1955 to 1961 he covered the United Nations and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's visit to this country in 1959. Victor Marchetti wrote: "In 1955 Sam Jaffe applied for a job with CBS news. While he was waiting for his application to be processed, a CIA official who Jaffe identifies himself as Jerry Rubins visited his house in California and told him, 'If you are willing to work for us, you are going to Moscow' with CBS. Jaffe was flabbergasted, since he did not even know at that point if CBS would hire him, and he assumes that someone at CBS was in on the arrangement or otherwise the Agency would never had known he had applied for work. Moreover, it would have been highly unusual to send a new young reporter to such an important overseas post. Rubins told Jaffe that the Agency was willing to release 'certain top secret information to you in order that you try and obtain certain information for us.' Jaffe refused and was later hired by CBS for a domestic assignment." [Cult, page 335] In 1960 Jaffe went to Moscow for CBS to cover the trial of Francis Gary Powers. In 1961 Jaffe joined ABC and went to Moscow to open its first bureau there. He was among the first to report the ouster of Khrushchev from politics on the night of October 14, 1964. In 1965 he was expelled from the Soviet Union because of a report ABC carried from Washington saying that another shake up in the Soviet leadership was imminent. By then Jaffe had already been assigned to take over ABC's Hong Kong Bureau. As the war in Vietnam deepened he was sent there and for his coverage he won a prize from the overseas press club. In 1968 he was reassigned to the United States and moved to Washington. The following year he resigned from ABC.

In the 1950's and 1960's Jaffe had a brilliant run as a newspaper and broadcast journalist, however, in 1969 allegations circulated regarding Jaffe's connection with the KGB based on information supplied by Nosenko. The FBI reported: "During the period 1958 to 1960 while in New York, Jaffe was an FBI confidential informant on his Soviet contacts. In addition, he had several meetings with the Domestic Contacts Division New York office. While in Moscow with ABC, Jaffe felt he was the Subject of a KGB recruitment attempt in 1962. He recounted his story to the Regional Security Officer at the American Embassy, Moscow, copies of which went to both the CIA and FBI. Jaffe covered the trial of Gary Powers for the ABC Television Network, and flew on the same plane from New York to Moscow with Barbara Powers' party. Prior to that trip, he was briefed by a CIA psychologist on ways to observe Power's behavior and demeanor. During the latter part of his time in Moscow, Jaffe was in contact with a KGB Officer, Kuvkov, and this relationship is a matter of record with the FBI. Jaffe has given his version of his dealings with the KGB in a lengthy interview with the FBI in 1969. Yuri Nosenko provided information on Jaffe's relationship with the KGB in 1964. However, as time went on, further debriefings of Yuri Nosenko indicated Yuri Nosenko was not as sure about Jaffe's relationship as he had been originally. By 1968 Yuri Nosenko was positive only that Kuvkov had been in touch with Jaffe, but Yuri Nosenko was not certain that Jaffe was a paid witting KGB agent. (Paragraph deleted.) The CIA is positive that Jaffe's recall from Hong Kong in 1968, and subsequent dismissal by ABC, are not related to any action taken by the CIA."

Sam Jaffe said that the CIA attempted to get him to act as an agent and obtain information from Chinese Communist contacts. Mr. Jaffe said that while he was stationed in Hong Kong he was prepared to make contact with a Chinese official for the CIA, but he said that ABC recalled him from his assignment before the contact could be made. [NYT 2.9.76]

Sam Jaffe confronted the CIA about these charges and was given a letter stating he was not KGB agent by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William Colby. This was not enough for Sam Jaffe; instead, Sam Jaffe wanted to locate Yuri Nosenko and confront him. He contacted John Gittinger and Chief, CI/R&A, Leonard McCoy. Sam Jaffe was told the KGB wanted to kill Yuri Nosenko and a meeting was impossible. [CIA Dempsey Memo on Jaffe 12.8.75] Jaffe had regular conversations with ANGLETON. Covert Action reported: "Apparently, ANGLETON, had come to befriend Jaffe because of his conviction that he was the target of a KGB defamation attempt. A Soviet defector, Yuri Nosenko, interrogated ruthlessly by ANGLETON, hinted that Jaffe was a KGB agent. Since ANGELTON was convinced that Nosenko was a KGB double agent sent to sow disinformation and confusion, Jaffe had to be okay." [CA No. 29 (Winter 1988)]

YURI NOSENKO'S OTHER INFORMATION DID NOT CHECK OUT

Yuri Nosenko claimed with certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964 with two exceptions: "The first was that of (Deleted) who served in Moscow from April 1951 to July 1953. (Deleted) agreed to work for the KGB abroad, but not in the U.S., however, when (Deleted) returned home, he was approached by the KGB. (Deleted) worked for the KGB in the U.S. until September 1962. After denying involvement with the KGB in interviews with the FBI in 1964 and 1965, (Deleted) admitted that he had been approached by the KGB in Moscow in late 1953, that he had been offered a large sum of cash and gems in exchange for classified information concerning Embassy (deleted). The KGB officer who compromised Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, Reino Hayhanen, who defected in Paris in May 1957, also provided information leading to the arrest of (Deleted)."

The second exception concerned a counter-intelligence officer at the American Embassy who had been sleeping with his KGB Agent Russian housemaid. Yuri Nosenko said the KGB subsequently sent him pornographic photo montages. The KGB concluded that the American would not succumb to ordinary blackmail and consequently the maid was instructed to confess to him that she had been recruited by the KGB against her will and would be arrested if she did not fulfill her KGB tasks. The American agreed to help her. This man met with Gribanov on one occasion, then went to Ambassador Bohlen. Anatoliy Golitsyn had already provided the CIA with a similar story.

Yuri Nosenko consistently asserted that, had there been other recruitments, he would have learned some of the details. He discounted the fact that he was not always in the First Department, which was responsible for Embassy recruitment.

THE CASE FOR YURI NOSENKO BEING BONA FIDE

In 1976 John L. Hart was brought out of retirement to conduct a study of the Yuri Nosenko case. Hart testified before the HSCA in 1978. That year, Leonard McCoy, AC/CI, released this statement: "Yuri Nosenko was probably the most valuable source of counter-intelligence information that the U.S. Government has ever had....He identified some 2,000 KGB officers and 300 Soviets who were acting as KGB agents. He provided information on 238 Americans in whom the KGB had displayed some interest, including many who had been recruited. For example, one of his identifications led to the trial, and a sentence of 25 years, for U.S. Army Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson. Nosenko also provided information on some 200 foreign nationals in 36 countries in whom the KGB had taken an active interest...the British were able, on the basis of Nosenko's information, to identify William John Vassall, a high official of the British Admiralty, as a KGB agent, and sentence him to 18 years." Gerald Posner was granted an interview with Yuri Nosenko. Yuri Nosenko explained that his appearance in Geneva in January 1964 was arbitrary: "Disarmament negotiations were postponed twice in 1963. 'If there had been a meeting as scheduled in the Spring of 1963, I would have defected then...'"

Many other defectors said Yuri Nosenko was bona fide including, Fedora, who worked in the Soviet Union's Mission to the United Nations. Gerald Posner listed nine other similar defectors who believed Yuri Nosenko was authentic, but failed to state how they knew this, and where they made their statements. Additionally, questions have been raised regarding some of these men:

(1) Yuri Loginov (1961). Yuri Loginov was a KGBnik who went to the American Embassy, Helsinki, in 1961 and offered to act as an agent-in-place. He did so for six years, undetected by the Soviets. In 1967 he was arrested by the South Africans for spying on behalf of the Soviet Union. ANGLETON betrayed him because his case officer, Richard Kovitch, was suspected of being a mole, due to ambiguous information supplied by Anatoliy Golitsyn. Yuri Loginov was sent back to the Soviet Union in a spy trade. His fate there remains unclear.

(2) Igor Kochnov (1966).

(3) Obscure Soviet trade delegate Oleg Lyalin, 34, who defected to Britain early September 1971. He was 27 years old when he had knowledge of Yuri Nosenko. As a result of his defection, 90 Soviet delegates were PNGed from London. Oleg Lyalin revealed the Soviet's intent to sabotage military installations. He was a double-agent for six months before he defected. Oleg Lyalin was a bona fide defector - he blew too many other agents cover not to be so.

(4) Rudolph Albert Herrmann studied in East Germany then went to the United States in 1968. He was rolled over in 1977.

(5) Ilya Grigorevich Dzhirkvelov was a KGB officer with a history of alcoholism. He worked in the Soviet media from 1958 to 1965. He defected after a car accident in 1980.

(6) Vladimir Andreyevich Kuzichkin joined the KGB in 1975. He was a senior KGB officer in Tehran, who defected to the British, in June 1982. Vladimir Kuzichkin produced a list of Soviet agents in Iran. Many of them were executed.

(7) Viktor Gundarev (1985).

(8) Vitaliy Yurchenko (1985). Vitaliy Yurchenko was a senior intelligence official who defected to the West in 1985, and redefected in November 1985. Before he returned to the United States he said he had been kidnaped, drugged and tortured by the CIA. Yurchenko provided information to the CIA on Edward Lee Howard, a CIA officer who worked for the KGB. Howard fled the United States after he was exposed by Yurchenko. This indicates that Yurchenko was a bona fide defector. Yurchenko passed the CIA's lie detector tests. Yurchenko probably re-defected after his lover refused to defect with him. [NYT 11.8.85] Just who this lover was is unclear. The New York Times reported: "The woman in Toronto, Svetlana Dedkov, 48 years old, fell to her death from the 27^th floor of a 35-story apartment building in the Toronto suburb of Etobicoke. Her husband, Boris Dedkov, worked for Stan-Canada, a Soviet machine tool trading company in Toronto." The Canadian police stated that they found a suicide note. Her suicide took place the morning after the defector said he was going home. The New York Times reported: "The sources here linked Mr. Yurchenko to a Soviet diplomat's wife in Ottawa, who they would not identify. One official said that he heard that the Soviet Embassy might have flown her back to Moscow on Thursday to get her out of the way...After defecting, officials said, Yurchenko visited a woman in Canada with whom he had been involved with while stationed at the Soviet Embassy here from 1975 to 1980. But she sent him away, the Americans, said." [NYT 11.6.85] The Canadian government would not confirm or deny that Yurchenko visited Canada. What is Vitaliy Yurchenko doing in Russia today? Where did Yurchenko release the information that Nosenko was bona fide.

(9) Oleg Gordievskiy, 46, a Soviet Consul in London, was U.K. KGB Chief. He defected in September, 1985. Twenty-five Soviet nationals were expelled as a result of his collaboration with the British. Oleg Gordievskiy joined the KGB in 1962, where he worked in Department S of First Directorate, which concerned itself with illegals in the West. Oleg Gordievskiy claimed that the Soviet Union believed the United States was going to attack in early 1981. Former CIA/DD George Carver labeled this disinformation. Twenty five Soviet nationals are a lot of people to burn in any operation. Gordievskiy was bona fide. Again it was not stated where Gordievskiy said Nosenko was bona fide.

Many respected authors like David Wise and Tom Mangold were convinced Yuri Nosenko was genuine. Edward Petty: "The Bureau, as far as I know, considered him to have been a really good source. He was real, as far as being a Second Chief Directorate officer."

The CIA: "If Yuri Nosenko was dispatched, it is felt that he, during his 1962 contacts, would have been very carefully briefed and that his remarks or statements would have not been of a nature that would have caused any suspicion in regard to the bona fides of Yuri Nosenko." The CIA explained why Anatoliy Golitsyn and Yuri Nosenko furnished the same information: they were both in the same section of the KGB. The CIA explained Yuri Nosenko's lack of knowledge concerning the trip that Kosolapov made to Helsinki in November 1960: "It cannot be interpreted as evidence Yuri Nosenko was dispatched by the KGB since, if he had been, he would have been briefed on the trip, as this was an event the KGB knew Golitsyn was aware of."

THE MIDDLE GROUND

Did Yuri Nosenko lie because he had been exposed to false or limited information, then allowed to, or was spooked into, defecting? Edward Petty: "The facts and timing with respect to Yuri Nosenko's defection and his provision to the CIA of information about OSWALD in the Soviet Union make it virtually certain that the KGB knew that he was going to defect, and expected him to provide the CIA with the extent of his knowledge concerning OSWALD. Various information, including much of Yuri Nosenko's own conduct, has subsequently provided the basis to accept that Yuri Nosenko is personally genuine. There is no other conclusion but that the KGB allowed him, or motivated him, to defect without his realizing that to have been the case. Just such a technique had been used successfully by the KGB in the Goleniewski case only four years earlier."

"SNIPER"

In March 1958 "Sniper" (Michael Goleniewski, a renegade Polish Intelligence officer) contacted the U.S. Embassy in Bern, Switzerland, by mail and offered information about communist espionage activities. Howard Roman studied the contents of the letters and determined that they were written by a German speaking Pole. The information was evaluated in Project BEVISION. "Sniper" led the CIA to KGBniks Gordon Lonsdale (Russian Colon Molody) and George Blake, who had compromised the Berlin Tunnel. He exposed an Israeli citizen named Israel Beers as a KGB mole. "Sniper" defected in December 1960. Evidence existed that the KGB had false information planted on him before his defection, then spooked him into defecting. Michael Goleniewski remembered having been told by a KGBnik that Stafan Bandera, an anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist living in Munich, had been murdered on the night of October 15, 1959, by the man with whom he was having supper, German intelligence service (BND) agent Heinz Danko Herre. The CIA later learned Heinz Danko Herre was innocent: "The Legal Attache in Bonn in June 1962, reviewed information furnished to the Germans by Bogdan Stashinsky, which indicated that he was recruited by the KGB in 1952...in 1958 he was told that because he had proved himself, he would be given an important mission against Ukrainian émigré groups in the West. This mission turned out to be the assassination of Dr. Lev Rebet and Stafan Bandera, émigré leaders in Munich. He murdered Lev Rebet in 1958 and Stafan Bandera in 1959...by spaying poison in his victim's face which made death appear to be from a heart attack." [FBI 62-109090-NR 1.24.64 Sullivan to Branigan] The Soviets had deliberately planted the Heinz Danko Herre story on Michael Goleniewski to make trouble between the CIA and BND. Michael Goleniewski was told that Henry Kissinger had been recruited by the Soviets in the aftermath of World War II. No evidence of this has surfaced to date. Edward Petty: "The Soviets had details of the Goleniewski case as it was going on. They therefore had a clear-cut penetration. A penetration of that level had also to know the Nosenko case. Ergo, if you accept that hypothesis, then they knew about Nosenko. The key is that Nosenko himself was quite genuine. Nosenko was in the Second Chief Directorate and handled OSWALD material in the normal course of events. So he was perfectly willing to tell what he knew. The material was true as far as the Second Chief Directorate was concerned. If you accept the evidence from Nosenko himself that he personally is genuine, that does not mean that he is genuine as far as an unwitting control is concerned. ANGLETON was doing exactly what they wanted to happen.

"The second part of the Nosenko affair dealt with KGB penetration of CIA and the Golitsyn case. Golitsyn had predicted Nosenko's appearance and that he would try to discredit his bona fides as a defector. ANGLETON was always saying the Nosenko was going to destroy Golitsyn's leads and therefore he would destroy Golitsyn. Nosenko was a pawn in whatever play was going on involving ANGLETON and Golitsyn.

"When they ultimately gave him polygraph tests that were not rigged, Nosenko came out perfectly all right. The Soviets let him out. He didn't know he was playing their role. What they did to make him run, I don't know. That's the reason they never broke him."

Edward Petty pointed out that Nosenko was never asked, "'Think about it fellow, are there any facts which would cause you to believe that the Soviets were putting pressure on you to leave?' Whether he would tell anybody such a thing at this point is something else. The CIA in that sense was inclined to look at things as either black or white. Either he was 'Okay' or he was a dispatched agent. They didn't understand that there could be a middle ground."

Cleveland Cram stated: "At that time ANGLETON foolishly did not believe Nosenko, not because of OSWALD and the assassination, but because of Golitsyn having denounced him. I believe Nosenko was bona fide." Cleveland Cram was asked if Yuri Nosenko could have unwittingly been given false information then spooked into defecting. He stated: "If you had a big conspiracy in the Soviet Union he might have been shown false stuff and reported that. It was looked into. With the evidence we have now from the Soviets, we know that is not true. Nosenko saw what the KGB had, and he reported what he saw. The problem was that JIM was so screwed up in his thinking because of Bagley and Golitsyn he did not want to accept Nosenko, who was the only person who really had first hand information on OSWALD in the West, available to us. ANGLETON didn't have the brains to run OSWALD as vestpocket operation. That's ridiculous. OSWALD was too unreliable. All you guys in this conspiracy shit should do something else. Like the JFK movie. It's just not true." Cram was asked if there could have been a middle ground: "His information was very accurate about all the important things. He had access to the OSWALD file after the assassination. I know the sun rises in the East and sets in the West. Nosenko was a genuine defector. It is firmly established now. Former Soviet Generals will tell you this. I'm not sure that Goleniewski had any false information planted on him before his defection. That's a theory cooked-up by nut cases like JIM ANGLETON, who never could prove it. ANGLETON was trying to prove some of his goofy theories, and that's how it got started. Goleniewski says it isn't true."

ANALYSIS OF MIDDLE GROUND THEORY

OSWALD did not supply the Soviets with strategic information until April 1960. His report could have been placed in a RESTRICTED file. Yuri Nosenko might have been exposed to the non-sensitive OSWALD file and was assigned to Geneva then provoked into defecting. Or he might have defected on his own. Either way he would have been genuinely convinced the KGB had no connection with OSWALD. As for the contradictions in his story about OSWALD and the KGB, Scott Malone believed: "He was a drunk and a lair. He lied - because he was a liar." Did he lie because he was trying to exaggerate his importance to the CIA?

The CIA explored something akin to "a middle ground" when it asked: "Is there evidence of a political or any other type objective which could justify a dispatch of Yuri Nosenko by the KGB with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his knowledge of the KGB and without Yuri Nosenko being given a specific mission? The above possibility has been given consideration, even though the ultimate ramifications are practically incalculable. The conclusion is that as regards Nosenko, with the single exception detailed below, there is no evidence of a political type objective which could be considered of sufficient importance by the KGB to warrant the dispatch of a KGB officer with the knowledge of Nosenko to speak freely with the CIA without his being given a specific mission, or missions, by the KGB...The only area touched upon in any way by Nosenko which might meet the above requirements is the assassination of President Kennedy."

The CIA also asked: "Is there any evidence that the contacts of Nosenko in 1962 or in 1964 with the CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection?" The CIA: "It is recognized that since positive factual confirmation such as the KGB file on Nosenko is not available, any conclusion concerning whether Nosenko was, or was not, dispatched by the KGB can only be based on a full review of available information from Nosenko...One of the particular areas considered was his apparent behavior during his contacts with the CIA in June 1962 and the conclusion was that it was incomprehensible that he could have been under KGB control at the time." The CIA reasoned that had Nosenko been under KGB control, he would not have expressed considerable concern over his personal security, but it had to admit: "It is recognized that the above indicated concern is not substantial evidence that Nosenko was not under KGB control." The CIA also dismissed the possibility that the Soviets discovered that the documents Yuri Nosenko had stolen were missing. It cited the fact Yuri Nosenko lied about his rank as further proof of his bone fides: no dispatched KGB agent would be that stupid. The possibility that Yuri Nosenko was discovered, then "spooked" into defecting, was not covered in this report.

YURI NOSENKO AND THE WARREN COMMISSION

Yuri Nosenko offered to testify before the Warren Commission. The CIA never allowed him to do this, nor was he mentioned in the Report or Twenty-Six Volumes. Interviews with Yuri Nosenko were included in the documents of the Warren Commission. Edward Petty commented, "While the CIA considered Nosenko to be a dispatched agent from the word go, actually from before he ever arrived, the CIA could not hold back word of what Nosenko had to say about OSWALD from the Warren Commission." The CIA told the HSCA: "CIA was unable to resolve satisfactorily the question of his bona fides until well after the Warren Commission had completed its work. The point is that CIA, per se, did not reach an agreed position on Mr. Nosenko until late 1968." Former President Gerry Ford was Yuri Nosenko's foremost opponent:

Ford: I have been led to believe, by people who I believe know, that there is a grave question about the reliability of Nosenko being a bona fide defector...I feel so strongly about this that I just think the Commission has got to make a decision on it.

Warren: I am allergic to defectors...So I think exactly as you do, Gerry.

Dulles: I concur in what you said. Over the weekend I had an opportunity to discuss the Nosenko matter in some detail with my former colleagues...

Ford: It is my best recollection that he was actually a defector some time in December, at a disarmament meeting in Geneva, Switzerland. And the original press releases were to the effect that he was a highly significant catch as far as we were concerned...There was a great mystery about his particular defection, because the Soviet Union made such a protest - they went to the Swiss Government and raised the devil about it. Now subsequent information has developed that he doesn't appear to be quite as big a catch, if any, as far as we were concerned. Having absolutely no faith in what the Soviet Union tries to do in these cases, he might have been dangled for one reason two or three months before the assassination, but pumped last th (illegible) the assassination, and a man that was as high as he allegedly is, with the mental capacity he is supposed to have, could very well be filled with all the information which he is now giving us in reference to the OSWALD case. As I say, I am a complete and total skeptic and cynic about these kinds of people, and there would be no better way for the Soviet Union to try and clean its own skirts than to have a high ranking defector come and discount OSWALD'S importance, OSWALD'S significance while in the Soviet Union." [WC Proceedings 6.23.64]

BRANIGAN'S DOUBTS ABOUT NOSENKO

William Branigan pointed this out to William Sullivan: "With respect to the points that are to be elaborated on, Nosenko stated that he next heard about OSWALD two hours after the assassination of President Kennedy when he was summoned to the KGB center in Moscow. The time element of two hours is highly unlikely. Elsewhere, Nosenko states that when OSWALD appeared at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, the First Chief Directorate of the KGB at Moscow was advised of his interest in returning to Russia and the First Directorate consulted the Second Directorate. This could only have occurred in late September or early in October 1963, but then Nosenko says following the assassination no file on OSWALD could be located at the KGB center in Moscow. This seems unlikley." [NARA FBI 124-10169-10063]

YURI NOSENKO'S IMPRISONMENT

The CIA kept Yuri Nosenko locked up for five years under prison-like circumstances. He was tortured and deprived of basic human necessities. Helms commented: "One of the first problems we had with him in the United States was he liked to drink and carouse. One of the reasons to hold him in confinement was to get him away from booze..." Yuri Nosenko undertook numerous polygraph tests. One of these tests, according to Helms, "was designed as sort of a psychological trick on Nosenko to indicate that he wasn't telling the truth." He was administered L.S.D.

The FBI was convinced Yuri Nosenko was real: "The FBI perceived Nosenko's statements about OSWALD, depending upon a subsequent, definitive resolution of Nosenko's bona fides, to be the most authoritative information available, indicative of a lack of Soviet Governmental involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy. The FBI found no substantial basis to conclude that Nosenko was not a bona fide defector..." On November 16, 1964, J. Edgar Hoover sent Deputy Director/Plans, Richard Helms, a highly deleted communication: "Reference is made to our letters in this case dated July 28, 1964, and August 14, 1964, dealing with possible association of LEE HARVEY OSWALD (several paragraphs deleted). Nosenko, the KGB defector, claims to have handled OSWALD case for KGB. He says KGB was not interested in the OSWALD case."

YURI NOSENKO'S REHABILITATION

In 1967 Bruce Solie, of the CIA's Office of Security, wrote a critique of a lengthy report Tennent Bagley had prepared on Yuri Nosenko. Bruce Solie determined that Yuri Nosenko had not been dispatched. During the tenure of the HSCA, Bruce Solie, Chief of the Security Analysis Group, supplied the Committee with many of its documents. In 1968 the FBI issued a Top-Secret Nosenko Report. A line not withheld read: "Other examples of inadequate interrogation and collateral investigation are set forth in the attached paper." Yuri Nosenko was freed in April 1969. He was put on the CIA payroll as an independent contractor.

YURI NOSENKO'S HSCA TESTIMONY

In 1979 the HSCA questioned Yuri Nosenko about why the Soviets allowed OSWALD to remain in Russia. He said two psychiatrists determined he was insane, and if they tried to deport him he might commit suicide: "Simply a mentally unstable person, they didn't want to go it on any such action." Yuri Nosenko declared that, although extensive KGB resources were devoted to physical and technical surveillance of OSWALD, the KGB never interviewed him.

In 1964 Yuri Nosenko had supplied different information to the FBI: OSWALD was put under "passive observation to make sure he was not an American intelligence agent temporarily dormant...in view of instructions from KGB, Moscow, no active interest in OSWALD could be taken in Minsk without obtaining prior approval from KGB, Moscow. No such approval was ever requested or granted and based on his experience, he opined that the only OSWALD coverage during his stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his place of employment, inquiry of neighbors and review of his mail." Yuri Nosenko explained: "Well I told them there was work done against OSWALD; it was ordered, passive work, it's called passive. Whenever it's ordered not to make an approachment, not to make a contact, not to make a recruitment, this is passive."

THE YURI NOSENKO INCUBUS

When ANGLETON was deposed in HUNT v. ajweberman in 1979, he stated: "Well, I will simply say that during my tenure the [Nosenko] case had never been resolved...and, Mr. Helms, in his testimony before the assassination committee recently, had words to the effect that the problems of Nosenko were still an incubus that hung over our heads...I have never in a, as a matter of policy and as a matter of professional judgement, come to any conclusion other than the case was unresolved. That was the official position and I can speak to my tenure. That was the official position of the former Deputy Director of Operations, i.e., the Clandestine Services, Thomas Karamessines. It was reflected in the FBI disseminations of his reports to the effect that they were from a defector whose bona fides had not been resolved...There were many speculations that the so-called methodology that Nosenko alleged was the methodology of the KGB was inaccurate, but that was in the realm of speculation based on very thorough analysis of Nosenko's testimonies. As I said earlier, the incubus was still hanging over our head. There was no quotation, no determination." Helms told the HSCA: "To this very day no person familiar with the facts, of whom I am aware, finds Mr. Nosenko's comments about OSWALD and the KGB to be credible. That still hangs in the air like an incubus."

ANALYSIS

Nosenko was dispatched by the Soviets to disassociate OSWALD from the KGB. He had to remain in America and he could never redefect. He would be condemned as a traitor by the Russian Intelligence Service and sentenced to death. It was unlikely the death sentence could be carried out within the United States. He was an extremely strong-willed person, and could not be broken by torture. He may have supplied the CIA with a lot of good information, but his information about OSWALD and others was a lie. Nosenko's real mission was to prevent World War III by supplying the CIA with information which disassociated OSWALD from the KGB.

OSWALD: JULY 1960 TO NOVEMBER 1960

"July summer months of green beauty, pine forest, very deep. I enjoy many days in the enviorments of Minsk with the Zegers who have a car "Mosivich". I always goes along with Anita. Leonara seems to have no Sov-friend, many admirirs. She has a beauiful Spanish figure, long black hair, like Anita. I pay much attention to her shes too old for me she seems to dislike my lack of ambition for some reason. She is high strung. I have become habituated to a small cafe which is where I dine in the evening the food is generally poor and always strictly the same, menue in any cafe, at any point in the city. The food is cheap and I don't really care about quiality after three years in the U.S.M.C."

By September 1960, OSWALD was becoming openly critical of Soviet society: "As my Russian improves I become increasingly concious of just what kind of a sociaty I live in. Mass gymnastics, complusory afterwork meeting. Complusary attendance at lectures and the sending the entire shop collective except me) to pick potatoes on a Sunday, at a state collective farm. A "patroict duty" to bring in the harvest. The opions of the workers (unvoiced) are that its a great pain in the neck. They don't seem to be esspicialy enthusia about any of the "collective" duties. I am increasingly aware of the presence, in all things, of Lebizen, shop party secretary, fat, fortyish and jovial on the outside. He is a no-nonsense party regular."

"October 1960. The coming of Fall, my dread of a new Russian winter are mellowed in splendid golds and reds of fall in Belorussia. Plums pearch appricots and cherrys abound for these last fall weeks. I am healthy brown color and stuffed with fresh fruit. (at other times of the year unobtainable)"

ELLA GERMAN

"October 18, 1960. My 21st birthday see's Rosa, Pavil, Ella at a small party at my place. Ella a very attractive Russian Jew I have been going walking with latly, works at the radio factory also. Rosa and Ella are jelous of each other it brings a warm feeling to me. Both are at my place for the first time. Ellas and Pavil both give ash-tray's (I don't smoke) we have a laugh.

"November 1960. Finds the approch of winter now. A growing lonliness overtakes me in spite of my conquest of Ennatachina, a girl from Riga, studing at the music conservatory in Minsk. After an affair which lasts a few weeks we part.

"November 15, 1960. In Nov. I make aquiataces of four girls roomming at the For. lan. Dormitory in room 212. Nell is very interesting, so is Tomka, Tomis and Alta. I usually go to the institute domatory with a friend of mine who speaks English very well, Eraich Titov 22: is in the forth year at medical insitute. Very bright fellow. At domatory we sit and talk for hours in English.

"December 1960. I am having a light affair with Nell Korobka."

The Warren Commission named Eric Titovyets as OSWALD'S oldest existing acquaintance. In his Historic Diary, OSWALD reflected he did not trust Eric, who was a loyal Communist Party member, and did not tell him he was returning to the United States until one day before his departure. [CIA 1295-482, 1295-482]

OSWALD: JANUARY 1961

"January 1, 1961 - New Years I spend at home of Ella Germain. I think I am in love with her. She has refused my more dishonourable advances, we drink and eat in the presence of her family in a very hospitable atmosphere. Later I go home drunk and happy. Passing the river homewards, I decide to propose to Ella.

"January 2, 1961. After a pleasent hand-in-hand walk to the local cinima we come home, standing on the doorstep I propose's. She hesitates than refuses, my love is real but she has none for me. Her reason besides lack of love: I am american and someday simply might be arrested simply because of that example Polish Intervention in 20's led to the arrest of poeple in the Soviet Union of Polish origin "you understand the world situation there is too much against you and you don't even know it." I am stunned she snickers at my awkarness, in turning to go (I am too stunned tothink!) I realize she was never serious with me but only expolited my being an american, in order to get the envy of the other girls who consider me different from the Russian Boys. I am misarable.

January 3, 1961. I am misarable about Ella. I lover her but what can I do? It is the state of fear which was always in the Soviet Union."

Priscilla Johnson related that LEE told Marina Oswald "Being American, German thought I was a spy." He confided that he "loved Ella with all his heart," and "her only fault was that at 24 she was still a virgin, due entirely to her own desire...Our last formal date was in February 1961 after which I stopped seeing her." [Johnson Lee & Marina p401: CIA Name List with Traces] Was Ella German reporting back to the KGB? The CIA's Name List With Traces: "An American visitor in Moscow on 19(??) reported being assigned an interpreter named Ella Herman (also spelt German) who was described as single, Jewish and in her early 30's with an excellent command of English including a good vocabulary in thermodynamics. She claimed to have two years of experience translating for a chemical institute. Ella Herman was furnished by the Moscow Energetics Institute and was reportedly attached to the English chair of the Institute." Vladimir Semichastny said OSWALD'S primary interest was womanizing.

OSWALD OFFERED SOVIET CITIZENSHIP

"January 4, 1961 One year after I received the residence document I am called in to the passport office and asked if I want citizenship (Russian) I say no simply extend my residental passport to agree and my document is extended untill Jan 4, 1962.

"January 4, 1961 to January 31, 1961. I am stating to reconsider my desire about staying. The work is drab that money I get has nowhere to be spent. No nightclubs or bowling allys no place of recreation acept the trade union dances. I have had enough."

On January 12, 1961, S.A. John W. Fain was still assigned to the OSWALD case and was under the supervision of ASAC W. David Breen and SAC Curtis O. Lynum.

MARGUERITE OSWALD: "MY SON IS A SECRET U.S. AGENT"

In late January 1961 Marguerite Oswald traveled to Washington, D.C., where she met with D.E. Boster. "She thought there was some possibility her son had, in fact, gone to the Soviet Union as a United States Secret Agent, and if this were true, she wished the appropriate authorities to know she was destitute and needed money. Mrs. Oswald was assured there was no evidence to suggest her son had gone to the USSR as an agent, and that she should dismiss any such idea." In May 1992 the CIA Historical Review Committee released the CIA's copy of the State Department's "Memorandum of Conversation" of this meeting. The CIA copy was stamped "Limited Use - For Background Only. Pro anus [illegible] thru OCR required for any use [illegible] CIA."

In 1993 Boster stated: "At this point I don't remember precisely what she said but it certainly was that she suspected that at least that he might be an agent. I thought this was just totally crazy. Frankly, I don't think she knew what she was talking about." No matter what D.E. Boster told Marguerite Oswald she remained convinced her son was a CIA Agent. In early November 1963 Marguerite Oswald, a registered nurse, told a patient that her son was "a U.S. Government employee or agent." [FBI DL 89-43-1283, DL 89-43 11.22.63 Brown & Brown; CIA 261, 1122; OSWALD DOS File 1-2661, 1.26.61 serial 0075]

The Warren Commission noted that "Mrs. Oswald had introduced a statement to the effect that she suspected her son to be a CIA Agent." The Warren Commission asked Richard Helms, and David E. Murphy, if OSWALD had been a CIA agent: "Mr. Helms replied that he had not been. Mr. Willens then asked if there were any way of proving this. Mr. Helms remarked that in him and David E. Murphy, Chief, Soviet Russia Division, the Commission had the two Clandestine Service Officers who certainly would know whether or not OSWALD had been a CIA agent in the Soviet Union. He then said the Commission would have to take his word for the fact that OSWALD had not been an agent." [CIA 256]

ANALYSIS

D.E. Boster had no idea OSWALD worked secretly for ANGLETON. David E. Murphy was unaware of OSWALD'S connection to ANGLETON. Richard Helms may or may not have known.

J. EDGAR HOOVER AND MARGUERITE OSWALD

Marguerite Oswald was a hostile witness when she testified before the Warren Commission. In November 1966 J. Edgar Hoover recommended that the name of Marguerite Oswald be placed on the Protective Research List of the United States Secret Service "because background is potentially dangerous; Subversive; Evidence of emotional instability (including unstable residence and employment record) or irrational or suicidal behavior." Marguerite Oswald died on January 18, 1981, at age 73.

OSWALD: FEBRUARY 1961

OSWALD: "February 1, 1961. I made my first request to American Embassy, Moscow, for reconsidering my position, I stated "I would like to go back to the U.S."

On February 1, 1961, the State Department sent Airgram A-127 via diplomatic pouch to the American Embassy, Moscow, which requested that the American Embassy inform the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Marguerite Oswald was worried about her son. Delivery time for such pouches was from three to ten days. On February 5, 1961, before the American Embassy passed this message to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, OSWALD mailed a letter dated February 1, 1961 to the American Embassy, which the American Embassy received on February 13, 1961. In this letter, he expressed his interest in returning to the United States. American Embassy officials stated this was the first time they had heard from, or about, OSWALD, since November 16, 1959.

ANALYSIS

Marguerite Oswald's letter and OSWALD'S decision to leave the Soviet Union were unrelated. His mission had ended and he was not admitted to Patrice Lumumba University. The Warren Commission concluded: "The simultaneity of the two events was apparently coincidental. The request from Marguerite Oswald went from Washington to Moscow by sealed diplomatic pouch and there was no evidence that the seal had been tampered with." [WR p275] Richard E. Snyder: "All we could do in cases like that would be to forward a letter to the Foreign Office with a request that they forward it. We could not contact the individual himself."

REFERENCE TO LETTER U.S. EMBASSY NEVER RECEIVED

OSWALD'S February 5, 1961, letter to the American Embassy, Moscow, contained a reference to a December 1960 letter allegedly mailed to the American Embassy from Minsk, which the American Embassy never received: "Since I have not received a reply to my letter of December 1960 I am writing again asking that you consider my request for the return of my American passport." The CIA reported: "There is no indication in the diary or elsewhere in OSWALD'S papers of his having written to the Embassy in December 1960 as mentioned in the letter as set forth above. Furthermore, the diary refers to his February 1, 1961, letter as his first request concerning return to the United States. One possible explanation for reference to a spurious letter may be that OSWALD wished to give the Embassy the impression that he had initiated the correspondence regarding repatriation before having renewed his identity document on January 4, 1961."

ANALYSIS

OSWALD'S letter may have been intercepted by the KGB and not delivered to the American Embassy in order to give him time to reconsider his decision to re-defect.

D.E. BOSTER

D.E. Boster suggested the American Embassy, Moscow, mail him his passport directly. Secretary of State Dean Rusk vetoed this: "If the Embassy is fully satisfied that he has not expatriated himself in any manner...his passport may be delivered to him on a personal basis only, after being [illegible] valid for direct return to the United States. For security reasons, the Department does not consider that it would be prudent for the Embassy to forward OSWALD'S passport to him by mail." [DOS A-273, 4.13.61] In August 1961 a State Department passport analyst wrote a Memorandum for the Record in which he expressed incredulity that the decisions regarding OSWALD'S passport had been "routed to D.E. Boster of SOV." [DOS Memo Johnson to White 3.31.61; WCE 24A]

OSWALD'S ADDRESS BOOK

DAVID DEBOEY SAGIER

The OSWALD address book entries "Vera Alizberg, Lyudmilla p" and "American Express, Rotterdam" had the word Savoy next to them. The FBI stated "Savoy" referred to the Hotel Savoy, the former name of the Hotel Berlin. The CIA:

2. On page 28 (A2) of OSWALD'S address book there appears the notation which in all probability is several notations:

ACLU - Box 2251

Dallas

A. Ex.

K - 42000

384

1 - Z Diner

Room 384

Jelsavcic

MAASDAM

Holl - Amer.

92 Meent

120200

Rotterdamn

Debovy or Debooy

2. In the last line the Bureau apparently is not clear as to just what name was written. It shows 'DeBoey or Debooy' [rather than Savoy]. A number of individuals by this name were of interest in the case of David DeBoey Sagier [aka Zagier]. [CIA 1298-477 - M.D. Stevens] David DeBoey Sagier was a CI Staffer who "disappeared." It was unclear if he resigned or retired.

MICHAEL JELISAVAVCIC

The letters "AM EX" appeared at least six times in OSWALD'S address book; he also had the telephone number of the American Express office in Moscow. Next to it, the name "Jelisvacic" (the office manager, according to the phone book at the American Embassy and the words "one-two Di-ner" appeared. OSWALD mentioned nothing about this in his Historic Diary and the CIA stated that Michael Jelisavavcic's nationality was unknown, and that the CIA's Office of Security had a file on Michael Jelisavavcic. [Mader CIA 500 East Berlin FRD - AMEX; CIS/RRC Bulletin Lib. Cong. #JX1295-H45-A5; CIA 1298-477]

On December 17, 1968, the New York Office of the FBI sent this wire to the Director: "Enclosed herein for the Chicago Office are 14 copies of various communications relating to the investigation of Michael Jelisavavcic. Also enclosed for Chicago is one photograph of Jelisavavcic and one photograph of 'Sammy' for possible use during interrogation of Jelisavavcic.

"For the information of the Chicago Office, Michael Jelisavavcic, currently employed as an American Express Company representative, Moscow, USSR and is visiting US on home leave. It was ascertained, this date, that Jelisavavcic departed from the New York City area on December 11, 1968, en route to Chicago. Raymond V. Stormes, American Express Company Representative, New York City, advised that Jelisavavcic can be reached at the following address: 150-41 Morgan Street, Harvey, Ill. Tel. # 312- ED-1-3085. Jelisavavcic can be reached through the above address until January 1, 1969, when he is scheduled to depart from Chicago with connecting flights at New York direct to Moscow, USSR.

"The Bureau is requested to authorize Chicago to immediately interview Jelisavavcic in an effort to resolve all facts concerning possible compromise of Jelisvacic by Soviet intelligence during his employment within the USSR.

"The enclosures for the Chicago Office contain all pertinent information re Jelisavavcic in the possession of the New York Office. Chicago's attention is directed particularly to Bureau letter, dated January 8, 1965, in captioned matter wherein Jelisvacic's name and room number were in possession of OSWALD. During interview he should be questioned concerning all circumstances surrounding any possible association with or knowledge of OSWALD and this information should be set out in Letter Head Memorandum form suitable for dissemination under OSWALD caption. All other pertinent information re Jelisvacic's connection with Soviets in USSR and possible compromise by Soviet Intelligence should be set out in a form suitable for dissemination under Subject's caption." [FBI 62-109060- 1ST NR 6626 12.17.68; NARA FBI 124-10060-10199]

The addresses and telephone numbers of Soviet intellectuals appeared in OSWALD'S address book under names other than their own; for example, N.N. Krechetovich, a scientist who specialized in designing servo mechanisms was listed under "Lida." OSWALD'S address book contained numerous Russian names, sometimes noted as teachers, and many of these were associated with foreign language institutes in the USSR at that time. Some of these names appeared in early versions of the Name List With Traces, but not in later ones.

VERA ALIZBERG

"Vera Golevna (?) Alizberg" was listed as "German teacher consrv."

TO: The Record Date August 14, 1970.

From: (Deleted)

SUBJECT: OSWALD, Lee Harvey

Address Book - FBI Report December 31, 1963.

On page 11 of the above FBI report, showing listings in Subject address book on page 27 there appears the name "Alizberg, Vera V...." followed by a notation "illegible."

The files of OS contain no information identifiable with the name as listed above. In view of Subject's poor spelling, as evidenced in the address book, a possibility exists that the name was written phonetically. A possible correct spelling might be "Eliasberg" or "Eliazberg."

The rest of this document was deleted. [CIA 1319-487] OSWALD recorded the addresses of the East German, West German, Argentine, Polish and Dutch Embassies in his address book.

END OF NODULE 4

NODULE 5

MARINA & REPATRIATION

OSWALD: MARCH 1961

In reply to OSWALD'S letter dated February 14, 1961, Richard E. Snyder informed OSWALD he would have to personally appear at the American Embassy, Moscow. On March 20, 1961, the American Embassy received another letter from OSWALD, postmarked Minsk, March 5, 1961. Here OSWALD wrote it was inconvenient to visit the American Embassy for an interview and he could not leave Minsk without permission: "I believe there exist in the United States also a law in regards to resident foreigners from Socialist countries, traveling between cities...I do not think it would be appropriate for me to request to leave Minsk in order to visit the American Embassy...I have no intention of abusing my position here, and am sure you would not want me to." He requested the American Embassy send him a questionnaire in place of having the personal interview. When Snyder replied he assured OSWALD the Soviet Government interposed no objection to American citizens in the Soviet Union visiting the American Embassy.

ANALYSIS

OSWALD'S reference to "a law in regards to resident foreigners from Socialist countries" concerned restrictions put on suspected KGB agents by the United States, not on Russian tourists. Where did OSWALD learn about this law? From the KGB?

OSWALD: "February 28, 1961. I recive letter from Embassy. Richard E. Snyder stated "I could come in for an interview any time I wanted. March 1, 1961 to March 16, 1961. I now live in a state of expectation about going back to the U.S. I confided with Zeger he supports my judgment but warnes me not to tell any Russians about my desire to return. I undestande now why."

"March 17, 1961 - I and Erich went to trade union dance. Boring but at the last hour I am introduced to girl with a French hair-do and red dress with white slippers. I dance with her Than ask to show her home I do, along with 5 other admirares. Her name is Marina. We like each other right away She gives me her phone number and departs home with an not-so-new friend in a taxi, I walk home."

YURI MEREZHINSKIY

In a FBI interview during December 1963, Marina Oswald advised that "Yuri Merezhinskiy, a friend of OSWALD'S, had first introduced her to OSWALD at the Palace of Culture in Minsk on March 18, 1961. Marina Oswald further advised that the mother of Yuriy Merezhinskiy had given a speech that same evening...on her impressions of the United States." The CIA had traces on the Merezhinskiys that indicated they were Soviet intellectuals who had written numerous scientific papers. The Merezhinskiys lived at Leninsky Prospect 12, not far from KGB headquarters. Yuri Merezhinskiy told Norman Mailer that Marina Oswald had to leave Leningrad because she was a prostitute and she came to Minsk where "everybody fucked her."

"March 18, 1961 to March 31, 1961. We walk. I talk a little about myself, she talks a lot about herself. Her name is Marina N. Prooakoba."

On March 31, 1961 Edward J. Hickey of the State Department recommended that OSWALD'S passport be returned to him only on a personal basis because of the rumor that an imposter was using OSWALD'S identification. [NARA DOS 179-40007-10386]

MARINA PRUSSAKOVA APRIL 1961

OSWALD: "April 1, 1961 to April 30, 1961. We are going steady and I decide I must have her, she puts me off so on April 15, 1961 I propose, she accepts."

"April 31, 1961. After a 7 day delay at marraige beaure because of my unusual passport they allow us to regista as man & wife two of Marina's girlfriends act as bridesmaid: We are married at her aunt's home we have a dinner reception for about 20 friends and neborios who wish us happiness (in spite of my origin and accept) which was in general rather disquiting to my Russian since for. are very rare in the soviet union even tourist. After an evening of eating and drinking in which uncle Woser started a fight and the fuse blow on an overloaded circite we take our leave and walk the 15 minutes to our home. We lived near each other - at midnight we were home."

On April 31, 1961, OSWALD married Marina Prussakova, a 19-year-old Minsk pharmaceutical worker. Born July 17, 1941, Marina Prussakova was the illegitimate daughter of Klavdiya Prussakova, a 23-year-old laboratory worker whose lover was arrested by Stalin and sent to a prison camp from which he never returned (he reportedly belonged to a former Czarist officer group). Marina Oswald told this researcher: "I never knew who my father was. I know that where my mother was, there was a political prisoner, she could have had an affair with the man. But even my relatives wouldn't tell me. I have no idea if he was a Czarist. That's just a speculation of writers." Klavdiya Prussakova died in 1957, when Marina Prussakova was 16 years old. The stepfather of Marina Prussakova, Alexander Medvedev, refused to fight the Nazi invaders, and was interned in a prison camp. Marina Oswald told this researcher: "For what reason he was there, it was mess, I don't know."Marina Prussakova was raised by her grandmother, Tatyana Prussakova, a former Czarist. One of her daughters had made frequent trips to the United States. Marina Prussakova was baptized and was discharged from the Communist youth group, Komsomol, after she announced her intention to go to the United States. She was not a Communist Party member. [Johnson Lee & Marina pp. 13, 156, 18, 21]

THE AFGHAN DIPLOMAT

Marina Prussakova was involved in an incident with a Afghan diplomat, Abdel Julali, before meeting OSWALD. In HSCA testimony, Warren Commission Counsel Norman Redlich noted: "Some incident occurred between Marina Oswald and somebody in Moscow before she met LEE HARVEY OSWALD, which, as I recall, involved a diplomat, but it was purely a personal encounter...this [incident] might cause embarrassment between the United States and that government relating to this personal encounter. But it was purely a private matter and quite unrelated." [HSCA V12 p137] A withheld CIA document contained "a statement by an individual who believed he may have once seen Marina Oswald in Minsk. His acquaintance with her was casual and momentary." [CIA 55-785-B] A document dated July 27, 1960, CIA was denied: "The document is concerned with a discussion of information concerned with an individual who was presumed at one time to have been a possible acquaintance of Marina Oswald. It was clear from the document that it was a case of erroneous identification. He did not know Marina Oswald, and the document contains considerable information about several foreign intelligence operational methods used to validate the individual's information." [CIA 587-801] Marina Oswald told Norman Mailer that Irina, a neighbor, set her up to be raped by a member of a soccer team. Although she was not raped, she had to visit an institute for venereal and contagious diseases. Irina then set her up to be raped by an Afghan "client." The FBI released this highly deleted document on May 6, 1964: "Bureau Informant (Deleted), a most sensitive and reliable source, advised that Irina Alekseyevana Nikhaylovich of 43 Dzershinkiy Street, Apartment 4, Kharkov, USSR (Deleted)." [FBI 105-82555-3578 page 2 and 3 entirely w/h] Marina Oswald told this researcher: "I did not have affair with the Afghan diplomat. In a week I find out who is who. Only one person knew about that. I was raped by this guy." Counter-Intelligence was aware of Irina Alekseyevana Nikhaylovich. A 1958 HT LINGUAL Intercept Item 58J18AT "This item was written by one Irina Aleksayevna Mikhaylovich of Kharkov, USSR, (deleted) who mentions seeing one Marina. As Marina is known to have an aunt in Kharkov named Poline Mikhaylovich, it is considered possible that Irina Mikhaylovich (deleted) may be related to Marina Prussakova." [CIA Memo 5.1.64 HT LINGUAL Items Relating to OSWALD case] The CIA reported OSWALD had the name "Polina Mikhaylovich, also spelled Mikaylov, residing at V'ezd Trinklers, House 7, Apartment 5, in Kharkov (Deleted)." [CIA 1593-1121-A]

Marina Oswald's associate, Ruth Paine, testified that Marina Oswald "spoke of having met some young Cuban students who were traveling in Russia, or studying in Minsk, or both..." Marina Oswald was reportedly a sexually active individual and reportedly told Priscilla Johnson that she slept with her old boyfriend after her marriage to OSWALD. [Marina & Lee p129]

One unnamed CIA component produced the document, "Indications of Intelligence Involvement by Marina Oswald." These indications included:

(1) Mystery of fatherless patronymic. Could be deliberate to obscure a cover-damaging father.

(2) Refusal to identify certain individuals in her story, while identifying and giving information on others. Cover story incomplete or forgotten?

(3) Complete uncheckableness of her story.

This CIA component concluded: "The great number of discrepancies, unlikeliness, departures from known Soviet practice, omissions, etc. within Marina's story (as well as between her story and other information) points very strongly to the probability that she at least knew about and played along with KGB interest, if she was not actually recruited." Marina Oswald told this researcher: "Never, ever in my life was I knowingly involved with intelligence. If I was interviewed by some intelligence people, intelligence people in Embassy, I have no idea who they were. If Priscilla Johnson was with the government, I would have no idea. I was not told. I never worked for Soviet or American intelligence. I told Priscilla everything I know or suspect. The conclusions in her book are not mine."

LYUDMILA PRUSAKOVA

On December 13, 1963, (Deleted) of the CIA "Requested all traces regarding Lyudmila Nikolaevna Prusakova and Marina Nikolaevna Prusakova. It considerable [sic] possible that Prusakova may be related to the wife of LEE HARVEY OSWALD, Marina Prusakova." [CIA 402-165] On December 31, 1963, the CIA discovered that Lyudmila Nikolaevna Prusakova "arrived in London May 13, 1960, and departed May 25, 1960. Visa application gives name before marriage as Ischenko, born February 8, 1942. No details available on husband. Profession given as doctor in public health department at Kerch. Previously resided in Kiev. No further identifiable info. [CIA 446-182] Lyudmilla G. Prusakova was one of 28 students invited to England by the Union of Scottish Students.

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